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Comments
KOREMATSUS GHOST: A POST-SEPTEMBER 11TH ANALYSIS OF
RACE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Clashing for the first time since World War II are two constants of
constitutional interpretation: unwavering invalidation of racial discrimina-
tion and vitally needed deference to the government in times of national
emergency and war.1 In Korematsu v. United States,2 racial equality lost the
first battle between these interests. 3 This Comment argues that adopting
racial profiling in the war against terrorism is a practice dangerously unim-
peded by both past and present constitutional doctrine. 4 This Comment
also argues that current constitutional standards and policy should be in-
terpreted as preventing racially-based measures, even as the nation faces
arguably its greatest threat.
5
On September 11, 2001, nineteen Middle Eastern terrorists carried
out an obscene scheme that rivaled the most evil of human acts.
6
Rammed twice by hijacked airplanes, New York's World Trade Center tow-
ers fell with thousands caught inside. 7 Meanwhile, terrorists piled a third
passenger jet into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. and crashed a fourth
in rural Pennsylvania. 8 Evidence soon suggested that Arab Islamic mili-
tants backed by Osama bin Laden, a known anti-American terrorist, had
committed the massacre. 9 The aftermath has been marked by heated de-
1. For a discussion of the applicable constitutional doctrine to the current
terrorist threats, see infra notes 147-75 and accompanying text.
2. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
3. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218-23 (reasoning that wartime military and na-
tional security interests supported exclusion ofJapanese residents in West Coast).
4. For a discussion of past and present use of racial profiling against Arabs
despite Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments' protections, see infra notes 112-227
and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of current equal protection standards and reasoning be-
hind them, see infra notes 147-227 and accompanying text.
6. See CNN, Bush: 'This is good vs. evil' (Sept. 25, 2001), at http://
www.cnn.com/2001/us/09/25/gen.america.under.attack (reporting President
George Bush's characterization, "This is good vs. evil. There is no justification for
these actions.").
7. See Michael Grunwald, Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners; 2 Destroy World Trade
Center, 1 Hits Pentagon, 4th Crashes; Thousands Feared Dead; Bush Vows Retribution,
WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al (reporting events of September 11, 2001).
8. See id. at A13 (recounting eventual fate of hijacked airplanes).
9. See id. (reporting early information about Muslim-extremist involvement).
Osama bin Laden has been linked to prior terrorists acts against the United States.
See Frontline: Hunting Bin Laden (PBS television broadcast, Mar. 21, 2000), available
(451)
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bate on how to protect the United States from further attacks. 10 United
States Senator John McCain said of bin Laden, "I want the guy dead,
OK" 1 Naturally, the debate has focused on how to find terrorists in or-
der to stop them.
Desperate to avert more catastrophic terrorism, officials and legisla-
tors are reconsidering the usefulness of racial profiling. 12 Based on the
theory that Arabs and people of Middle Eastern ethnicity are dispropor-
tionately involved in the current terrorist threat, investigations using racial
classifications subject these groups to more intense scrutiny than other
ethnicities when they travel.' 5 Fueling support for this investigative
method are claims from other countries that such profiling decreases ter-
rorist attacks. 14 While some commentators argue that race alone should
determine who is stopped, race will likely be used either explicitly as one
suspicion-arousing criterion or implicitly as a starting point for vastly ex-
panded law enforcement discretion to detain.15
Evidence suggests this power expansion has, at least unofficially, al-
ready occurred. 16 In the two weeks following the attacks, over 500 people
at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/etc/script.html
(explaining extent of Osama bin Laden's influence and control over terrorist orga-
nizations). Allegedly protected in Afghanistan, bin Laden and his organization of
largely independent Muslim terrorists, Al Queda, had previously been tied to the
1993 World Trade Center Bombing, the 1997 destruction of two U.S. embassies in
Africa and the 2000 attack on destroyer USS Cole at port in Yemen. See id. (detail-
ing U.S. intelligence about bin Laden before September 11, 2001 attack on World
Trade Center and Pentagon).
10. See, e.g., Hardball with Chris Matthews, (CNBC television broadcast, Sept. 12,
2001), available at 2001 WL 22711105 [hereinafter Hardball] (presenting views by
Senators John McCain, John Kerry and Max Cleland).
11. Id. Soon after the attack, it was suggested that the United States might lift
its national policy forbidding assassination of foreign leaders. See id. (discussing
legitimate response to attack from individual terrorist leaders). Senator McCain
did not support sending a "specific assassin" to kill Osama bin Laden because trad-
ing assassination attempts would disfavor an open, free society. McCain made
clear, though, that the killing itself was desirable. See id. (quoting Senator
McCain).
12. For a full discussion of the theories and support for targeting Arabs, see
infra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
13. See generally Ronald J. Sievert, Meeting the Twenty-First Century Terrorist Threat
Within the Scope of Twentieth Century Constitutional Law, 37 Hous. L. REv. 1421
(2000) (raising concerns about Arab racial profiling); Jamie L. Rhee, Comment,
Rational and Constitutional Approaches to Airline Safety in the Face of Terrorist Threats, 49
DEPAUL L. REv. 847 (2000) (discussing practical aspects and solutions to terrorist
screening).
14. See Adrian Weale, Security Alert-Will Increased Security Measures Following
Tuesday's Terrorist Attack Make Flying Safer?, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 16, 2001, at P3
(reporting that Israeli airline, El A], uses racial profiling and has remained hijack
free for thirty years).
15. For a discussion of the types of racial profiling that could occur, see infra
notes 33-54 and accompanying text.
16. See Nightline: Profile (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 1, 2001), available at
2001 WL 21773011 (reporting racial profiling that may have already occurred).
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were either arrested or detained, and thousands of resident aliens were
asked to submit to "random questioning," almost all of them Arabic or
Middle Eastern. 17 In several cases, Arab-Americans spent weeks in jail, sus-
pected, as some see it, merely for being Arabs.' 8
Although these detentions involve searches and seizures that necessa-
rily implicate the Fourth Amendment, the searches and seizures are more
successfully challenged under equal protection jurisprudence. 19 In Whren
v. United States,20 the Supreme Court severely limited Fourth Amendment
challenges to racial profiling in favor of equal protection claims. 2' Moreo-
ver, classifications based on race are traditionally actionable through the
Equal Protection Clause.22
Wartime and national security interests, however, have often overrid-
den constitutional protection, even though equal protection doctrine im-
poses strong prejudice against racial discrimination. 23 With the United
States facing real threats from Arab terrorists, the ongoing war in the Mid-
dle East and the scrambling desperation for working security measures,
the pressure to use race as a criteria of suspicion is at its apex.24
This Comment explores the theoretical constitutionality of racial
measures adopted in the face of a national war or emergency. 2 5 Part II
describes the theories and willingness of the current political structure to
adopt racially-biased methods, outlines the current Fourth Amendment
and equal protection standards as applied to racial profiling and explains
constitutional deference in light of national security crises.26 Part III dis-
17. See id. (reporting detentions following Sept. l1th attacks).
18. See id. (discussing such detentions with Georgetown Law Professor David
Cole and U.S. Attorney Beth Wilkinson).
19. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
20. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
21. For a discussion of the doctrinal application and impact of Whren on racial
profiling claims, see infra notes 67-85, 135-46 and accompanying text.
22. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213-15 (1995) (de-
tailing history of racial classifications under equal protection standards).
23. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (holding
that World War II and national security were compelling governmental interests to
justify interning Japanese Americans).
24. For a discussion of the pressures behind the current search for terrorists,
see infra notes 33-66, 119-34 and accompanying text.
25. This Comment does not address the practical aspects of litigating an Arab
racial profiling claim in federal or state court. For a discussion of some of the
practical concerns, such as proving intent to discriminate, discovery, evidence and
other similar issues, see Honorable Phyllis W. Beck & Patricia A. Daly, State Consti-
tutional Analysis of Pretext Stops: Racial Profiling and Public Policy Concerns, 72 TEMP. L.
REv. 597, 612-18 (1999) (expressing concerns about proving equal protection vio-
lation and difficulties of securing evidence); Elizabeth A. Knight & William Kurnik,
Racial Profiling in Law Enforcement, 30 BRIEF 16, 18-23 (2001) (describing several
practical difficulties of litigating racial profiling cases).
26. For a further discussion of the background behind the current political
mindset in favor of adopting racial profiling, see infra notes 29-111 and accompa-
nying text.
2002]
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cusses the legal standards surrounding racial profiling in light of tradi-
tional deference to government during war and national emergency and
argues that race-conscious methods in the hunt for terrorists cannot be
justified under current constitutional standards and policies. 27 Part IV
weighs the totality of political and constitutional protection against civil
rights violations during war time and predicts social ramifications that
could emerge from lax protection. 28
II. THE POLITICAL PUSH AND THE CURRENT LEGAL STANDARDS
REGARDING RACIAL PROFILING
The potential use of racial profiling to combat terrorism is both a
legal and policy based issue.29 Preliminarily, although many Arabs af-
fected by such measures may be non-citizen aliens, it is important to clarify
that aliens legally inside the United States are afforded full Fourth, Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment protections. 30 In addition, even illegal aliens
are protected by the Equal Protection Clause. 31 Only aliens outside U.S.
territory, such as "enemy aliens" or those who have not developed societal
or residential connections with the United States, do not receive Fourth,
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment benefits. 32 Assuming, then, that these
27. For a further discussion of the legal standards regarding the debate about
racial profiling, see infra notes 112-227 and accompanying text.
28. For a further discussion of the potential constitutional protections that
could be used against racial profiling and the ramifications of not securing these
protections, see infra notes 228-36 and accompanying text.
29. For a discussion of both the policies and legal standards involved, see infra
notes 112-227 and accompanying text.
30. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 270-72 (1990) (sum-
marizing Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment protection as afforded once
alien lawfully enters and resides in United States or has "significant voluntary con-
nection" with United States as would "place him among 'the people' of the United
States"); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (finding resident
alien "person" for purposes of Fifth Amendment protection); Russian Volunteer
Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 492 (1931) (finding Fifth Amendment protec-
tion of resident aliens); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896)
(entitling aliens to Fifth and Sixth Amendment protection); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment protects resident
aliens).
31. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1982) (holding that illegal aliens
are afforded equal protection rights in order to prevent creation of underclass
residents that may be treated differently under law).
32. SeeJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784-85 (1950) (holding that Ger-
man "alien enemy" arrested in China and held in Germany cannot receive Fifth
Amendment protection); Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269-71 (interpreting Johnson
and holding that Fourth Amendment does not apply to search of Mexican citizen's
Mexican residence when suspect does not have any "voluntary connection" with
United States). Interestingly, one interpretation of Johnson may have significant
bearing on Middle Eastern terrorists and the application of the Constitution. In
Verdugo-Urquidez, Justice Brennan argued that Johnson's denial of constitutional
protection was based on war and "alien enemy" status rather than extraterritorial-
ity and lack of connection. See 494 U.S. at 290-91 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Uohn-
son] rejected the German nationals' efforts to obtain writs of habeas corpus not
[Vol. 47: p. 451
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core constitutional protections apply to Arabs who live and travel inside
the United States, the issue focuses on four fronts: (1) the imminence of
and support for using racial methods in the United States, (2) the use and
impact of racial profiling outside the United States, (3) the legal standard
applied to racial profiling in the United States and (4) the extent that the
legal standard protects rights during national crisis.
A. Pulse of the Nation: The Theories and Support Behind Racial Profiling
After September Eleventh
Following times of crisis, national security and safety are often hailed
as sacrosanct, not without reason, but civil rights and liberties become ex-
pendable.3 3 After the destruction of the World Trade Center, many pre-
dict such a trend will likely continue.3 4 The perception that Arabs are
disproportionately responsible for terrorism and most likely to strike again
has caused the attitudes of American leaders, the public, and legal and
political scholars to range from outright validation of racial profiling to
necessary, or at least inevitable, trade-off.35
because they were foreign nationals, but because they were enemy soldiers."). Al-
though Justice Brennan's argument seems limited to proven fighters for enemy
governments, it is unclear how "enemy soldier" status might be applied to deny
constitutional protection, even when the "enemy soldier" is a legal entrant to the
United States or has connections that would otherwise afford him constitutional
rights.
33. See generallyJAMES X. DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM & THE CONSTITU-
TION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (1999) (ana-
lyzing loss of civil liberties connected with terrorist attacks and legislation enacted
after bombing of Oklahoma City Federal Building); Richard Lacayo et al., Privacy
vs. Safety, TIME (Special Issue), Sept. 24, 2001, at 92 (recalling that national security
worries in World War II created Japanese-American internment camps and that
after Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing, Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) was given power to establish special court that could arrest, hold and
deport aliens without revealing evidence against accused); Eric Pianin & Thomas
B. Edsall, Civil Liberties Debate Revived Amid Efforts to Fight Terrorism: Senate Clears Bill
to Help FBI Tap Computer Communications, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2001, at All (not-
ing Espionage and Sedition Acts passed after World War I, which allowed easy
arrest and deportation, and 1996 legislation that gave INS trial and deportation
power expansion). The power given to the INS in 1996, known as trial by "secret
evidence," is widely criticized in legal circles because it allows holding and charg-
ing the innocent indefinitely without credible evidence. See Natsu Taylor Saito,
Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the "Racing" of Arab Americans as
"Terrorists", 8 ASIAN L.J. 1, 19-21 (2001) (detailing specific instances where people
tried before INS court were held for several years without knowing what evidence
kept them there).
34. See Lacayo, supra note 33, at 92 ("If ever there was a time when [Ameri-
cans] might be receptive to trimming their accustomed freedoms, that time is
now."); Pamela Sebastian Ridge & Milo Geyelin, Aftermath: Investigation and Mobili-
zation: Civil Liberties of Ordinary Americans May Erode, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2001, at
A5 (predicting that racial profiling is most likely area of law enforcement
reaction).
35. See generally Lacayo, supra note 33 (reporting atmosphere that is willing to
sacrifice liberties).
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Given the severity of the September 11 th attacks, many legislators and
policymakers seem willing to trade equality for increased national secur-
ity.36 Notably, Congressman Richard Gephardt announced, "We're in a
new world where we have to rebalance freedom and security."3 7 Congress-
man Trent Lott followed with similar language: "When you're in this type
of conflict, when you're at war, civil liberties are treated differently."3
8
These feelings, along with wide publicity that all the hijackers were Arabic,
has resulted in a willingness among lawmakers to deem Arab ethnicity as
relevant in terrorist screening.3 9 The theory behind this willingness is that
the responsibility for the recent attacks and the current war are linked to
one identifiable ethnic group and that targeting this ethnic group will
prove to be the quickest and most effective way to narrow the suspect pool
and stop future attacks. 40 This argument is further supported by the ur-
36. See Pianin & Edsall, supra note 33, at Al 1 (reporting legislative leaders
willing to compromise on liberties).
37. Id. (quoting congressional leaders as they debate how to "clamp down" on
suspected terrorists).
38. Id. Senator Lott went on to add, "We've been having an academic discus-
sion and holding our breath in this area for several years. We can't do that any-
more." See id. (adding to reality that Congress was moving forward with some
legislation that would curtail freedom in name of war).
39. See Attack on America, PROVIDENCEJ., Sept. 14, 2001, at A20 (reporting that
U.S. Representative Bob Barr summarized his attitude toward hunting for ter-
rorists by stating, "We're not interested in reading them their Miranda rights.");
Special Report: America United (FOX television broadcast, Sept. 16, 2001), available at
2001 WL 7790874 [hereinafter America United] (interviewing Attorney General
John Ashcroft, who denied sole use of race to detain but did not deny use of race
among other factors). Former Ohio Congressman and appropriations advisor
John Kasich responded to questions about racial profiling with, "Political correct-
ness is out the window, Sean. I mean I think the country has had it, flat out had it
with political correctness." Special Report: America United (Hannity & Colmes
anchoring) (FOX television broadcast, Sept. 16, 2001), available at 2001 WL
5076459 [hereinafter Hannity & Colmes] (interviewing several government officials
about domestic relations after September 11 th attacks). NewJersey Attorney Gen-
eral John FarmerJr., whose office has led an investigation to end racial profiling by
police in New Jersey, agreed that because of public safety and pressure on police
he could "see no reason" law enforcement would not be able to profile in terrorist
investigations. See Ridge & Geyelin, supra note 34, at A5 (examining attitudes
about racial profiling). Several other high government officials share similar views.
William H. Webster, former director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)
currently on a commission examining FBI security, warned that to win a war on
terrorism "there is going to have to be a relaxation on the ability to look for certain
kinds of conduct and perhaps even appearance. If people are coming from a
country that we think harbors terrorists, then they are going to have to be sub-
jected to substantial scrutiny." Edmund Sanders, Attacks Prompt Calls for More Pas-
senger Profiling, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2001, at A21. Peter Tarlow, government
security advisor and FBI agent trainer stated that racial profiling "can be a very
valuable law enforcement tool." Id. Tarlow acknowledged that "[i]t can also be a
terrible prejudice tool. It's a fine line." Id.
40. See Sievert, supra note 13, at 1453-56 (discussing idea that if United States
were at war with or under threat of terrorism from "England, Iran, or Latvia,"
threat perceived would be sufficiently high to validly consider English, Iranian or
Latvian ancestry to entertain suspicion of terrorism). Professor Sievert asserts that
[Vol. 47: p. 451
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gent climate and the preexisting profiling theory that where a racial group
is disproportionately involved in criminal activity, race becomes a legiti-
mate factor for suspicion.4
1
Concern and hesitation do exist, but as the government clamps down
on terrorism, the resignations are muffled amidst calls to expand law en-
forcement's stop-and-detain power. 42 Indeed, the rising desire to allow
law enforcement a freer hand to detect and track terrorists illustrates pop-
ular outlets for racial profiling, with race either used as an added prong
that creates reason to detain or an implicit starting point for unchecked
enforcement discretion. 43 If race were an added criterion for suspicion,
law enforcement could be "acting irresponsibly if they did not note a suspect's
ancestry while attempting to protect the nation in the midst of such a violent con-
flict between the different societies." Id. at 1454; see also Richard W. Bloom, Com-
mentary on the Motivational Psychology of Terrorism Against Transportation Systems:
Implications for Airline Safety and Transportation Law, 25 TRANSP. L.J. 175, 179 (1998)
(describing profiling philosophy as "depicting those most likely to engage in ter-
rorism" to ensure "the closer terrorists get to transportation targets, the closer they
will get to being greeted by antiterrorist and counterterrorist personnel"); Serge F.
Kovaleski, A Wide, Aggressive Probe Collides With Civil Rights: Innocent People May Face
Questioning, Experts Say, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2001, at A14 (" [W]hen law enforce-
ment agencies are under pressure they tend to cut corners and ... there may be
ethnic or racial profiling going on to narrow the pool of suspects.") (quoting
Harvard School of Government ProfessorJuliette Kayyem); Sanders, supra note 39,
at A21 (reporting security experts' proposals that war against terrorism would have
to center on profiling groups that come from certain countries because those na-
tionalities are more likely to harbor terrorists).
41. See, e.g., Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the
Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. RFv. 956, 1005-08 (1999) (extolling use of race in
seeking out certain groups known to be disproportionately involved in criminal
activity). Professor Thompson does not advocate use of race alone to predict crim-
inality, but instead as a "rough but workable proxy for suspicion" that could help
single out members of criminal organizations and, notably, "exclude a large por-
tion of the population from investigation." Id. at 1005-06. Such theories have
been accepted into modern jurisprudence with the Supreme Court recognizing
that in certain instances, racial appearance proves relevant to suspicion. See
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563-65 (1976) (holding risk of ille-
gal border crossing sufficiently high tojustify Mexican appearance as factor in bor-
der-stop); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-87 (1975) (same).
42. See Hardball, supra note 10 (broadcasting interview with John McCain in
which he stated very cautiously that racial profiling "would be a last resort"); Attack
on America, supra note 39 (quoting President George W. Bush's caution, "We will
not allow this enemy to win the war by changing our way of life or restricting our
freedoms."). Congress and the Executive Branch, however, responded oppositely.
Attorney General John Ashcroft deployed hundreds of U.S. marshals, customs and
border officials to the nation's airports to implement a new security regime. See id.
(reporting new security deployment). The Bush administration ordered the crea-
tion of special military tribunals that can try suspected terrorists quickly without
normal judicial constraints. See Lacayo, supra note 33 (detailing measures that may
constrain civil freedoms). In addition, on September 12, 2001, the U.S. Senate
quickly passed a broadly phrased expansion of law-enforcement power to force
Internet providers to disclose subscriber lists and e-mails, a sentiment that easily
carried over into other security arenas. See id. (discussing Senate proposal).
43. See Beck & Daly, supra note 25, at 608-09 (noting that few advocates for
racial profiling desire to use race alone to provide probable cause, but rather wish
7
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for example, a young American checking no luggage, shabbily dressed,
that had traveled to Afghanistan in the last two years plus having Middle
Eastern complexion would be more likely to be detained than a Caucasian
American.
44
Congress has already expanded law enforcement power.45 Attorney
General John Ashcroft pushed through Congress legislation that allows
indefinite detention of those deemed "a threat" to national security and
gives broad-scale search powers without notice to the subject.46 Although
to include race "as part of the probable cause mix") (citing Joseph Wambaugh,
Trust Cops'Intuition, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1998, at A22); Thompson, supra note 41,
at 1005-08 (advocating outright use of race as "one factor in the quantum of suspi-
cion" and extolling racial profiling in seeking out certain groups known to be in-
volved in criminal activity); America United, supra note 39 (interviewing Attorney
General Ashcroft, who when asked about racial profiling vaguely responded,
"[W]hen there are factors that elevate... any suspicion that there's a problem, we
take action"). Some supporters would allow law enforcement to use race as a rele-
vant factor, but would add limits. Suggesting that racial profiling could be made
less offensive if racial detentions were limited to search of possessions and luggage,
University of California Law Professor Gail Heriot stated that racial profiling could
be used validly "with the lightest of touches." See Newshour withfim Lehrer: Profile of a
Terrorist (PBS television broadcast, Sept. 26, 2001), available at http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/uly-decOI/racial-profile.html (broadcast-
ing roundtable discussion of civil rights experts on racial profiling and racial ten-
sion following attacks). In the same discussion, Newsweek columnist Stuart Taylor
suggested that special scrutiny of Arabs "for a limited time may be a justifiable
exception to the general rule [applied] against racial profiling." Id.
The Supreme Court has already held that certain enforcement officers must
have wide discretion and that such "light touch" or multiple factor stops would be
constitutional, even if based on race. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 563-65 (hold-
ing that border patrol officers should have wide discretion and that ordering car to
referral point where occupants would be questioned is sufficiently minimal intru-
sion to not be offensive even if "made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican
ancestry"); Sievert, supra note 13, at 1453-54 (discussing availability of race as one
"relevant factor" in searches and seizures).
44. See, e.g., NBC Nightly News with Tom Brokaw (NBC television broadcast,
Sept. 6, 1996) (reporting that Israeli airlines, El Al, adopts multi-element screening
procedures that include "young, dark-skinned males" and "Middle Eastern men
with Western passports" among other neutral factors). It seems clear that if race is
adopted into any sophisticated profiling system, it is usually part of a group of
indicia. See Gregory T. Nojeim, Aviation Security Profiling and Passengers' Civil Liber-
ties, 13 AIR & SPACE LAw. 3, 4-8 (1998) (contrasting and comparing computerized
multi-factor profiling adopted in United States and Israeli type profiling that ac-
tively screens based on national origin, complexion and religion among many
other criteria).
45. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) (enacting measures directly as response to recent, heightened
calls for security).
46. See Ashcroft, Leahy Anti-Terrorism Bills Center Stage This Week, CONG. Q. WASH.
ALERT, Sept. 24, 2001 (summarizing current proposed terrorism legislation); Neil
A. Lewis & Robert Pear, Negotiators Back Scaled-Down Bill to Battle Terror, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/02/ national/
02RIGH.html (predicting action by Congress to pass compromise on Ashcroft's
proposal). Ashcroft was adamant that federal agents need new tools "to identify,
[Vol. 47: p. 451
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such measures seem neutral, as past expansion of terrorist screening pow-
ers suggests, even facially non-discriminatory policies can covertly target
certain racial groups or clear a path for intentional discrimination.
47
Further, the public supports racial profiling by staggering margins.4 8
Nationwide polls show that almost seven in ten people, even among non-
white groups, agree that law enforcement should be able to randomly stop
people fitting the profile of a terrorist.49 A harbinger of the type of profil-
ing that might be allowed, the numbers hardly move when Americans are
asked specifically if people of Arab descent should undergo "special, more
intensive security checks" when flying; a solid six in ten favor it.50 Even
though some polls also report that Americans disfavored generally target-
dismantle, disrupt and punish terrorist organizations before they strike again."
House Judiciary Panel Delays Vote on Terrorism Legislation, CONG. Q. WASH. ALERT,
Sept. 25, 2001 (quoting Attorney General Ashcroft's remarks to U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives Judiciary Committee). A slightly altered version of Ashcroft's bill was
signed into law on October 26, 2001, allowing (1) indefinite detention yet requir-
ing review every six months; (2) searches without notice; and (3) expansion of
surveillance, intelligence gathering and criminal prosecutions of suspected ter-
rorists. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) (codifying most of what Ashcroft asked for).
47. See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 33, at 11, 44-47 (examining several indi-
rect ways, such as suppressing First Amendment rights of certain groups or al-
lowing FBI monitoring of certain groups, that past legislation has targeted those of
Middle Eastern decent); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protec-
tion: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 318-27 (1987) (dis-
cussing, more generally, ability of "facially neutral" methods to be discriminatory);
Nojeim, supra note 44, at 4-5 (discussing United States' airline adoption of Com-
puter-Assisted Passenger Screening (CAPS) and its potential to computerize ste-
reotypes); Saito, supra note 33, at 15-21 (discussing government association of
Arab-Americans with terrorists in enacting legislation that allows indefinite deten-
tion and use of secret evidence); Donna Smith, Comment, Passenger Profiling: A
Greater Terror Than Terrorism Itself., 32 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 167, 167-68 (1998)
(describing vividly example of free reign given to Israeli security officials, who may
subject individual passenger to probing questions about her ethnicity and origins
of her family name).
48. See Mark Z. Barabak, America Attacked-Times Poll, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16,
2001, at Al (reporting results of its nationwide poll examining steps U.S. citizens
would be willing to take to stop terrorism).
49. See id. (reporting specific numerical results). The Los Angeles Times poll
also revealed that Americans would be willing to pay higher taxes, sustain substan-
tial casualties in a war and allow government monitoring of every private e-mail.
See id. (revealing further public feelings after September 11, 2001).
50. See GAU.UP ORGANIZATION, Americans Felt Uneasy Toward Arabs Even Before
September 11, Sept. 28, 2001, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/
pr010928.asp (reporting that when asked specifically about those of Arabic decent,
American public favored specific racial restrictions). Even harsher restrictions
were also favored. See Melissa Sepos, Anti-Terrorism Laws Could Limit Rights, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 18, 2001, at 1, 39 (reporting poll figures that 50% of Ameri-
cans supported Arab identification card and 32% favored even more extreme mea-
sures, such as special surveillance akin to type that Japanese-Americans
experienced after Pearl Harbor).
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ing entire nationalities, focusing on Arabs and Arab-Americans was highly
favored.5 1
Finally, scholars and observers predict the onslaught of using ethnic-
ity in investigations and searches for terrorism as a result of proposed legis-
lation that widens parameters for law enforcement.5 2 Professor Lawrence
Tribe stated, "[C]ourts are likely to be much more in tune with the na-
tional mood of fear and animosity toward whole groups of people who
may be quite innocent but who are related ethnically or religiously to the
source of the harm."53 Put to the public's yearning question, "What can I
do?", Professor David Kairys glibly answered, "You can give blood, money
and your civil liberties."54
B. Pulse of Other Nations: The Influence of Other Nation's Racial
Profiling Policies
Policies adopted in other countries that have faced similar threats
prove influential on American politics. 55 Israeli airlines, El Al, is seen as
the prototype success story.56 Israeli terrorist screening includes profiling
that regularly singles out women traveling alone, shabbily dressed people
and Arabs.5 7 The Israelis apply the idea that focusing on a group sus-
51. See Sepos, supra note 50, at 39 (reporting various polls from CNN/USA
Today! Gallup, Newsweek, CBS/N.Y. Times and ABC/ Wash. Post and contrasting 62%
of population that said government would be mistaken to generally target nation-
alities with 60% in favor of special airline security for Arabs, 50% favoring Arab
identification cards and 32% favoring special intense surveillance on Arabs).
52. See Ridge & Geyelin, supra note 34 (reporting reactions from threats to
civil liberties).
53. Id. (quoting Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Tribe's prediction of likely
balance of national security with individual rights that prevent unconstitutional
search and seizure). Harvard colleague Alan M. Dershowitz predicted similar lim-
its. See Paul Raeburn et al., The Costs of Fighting Terrorism: There's Only so Much That
Can Be Done-and Much That Shouldn't, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Sept. 13, 2001, at
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash /sep2001/nf200l0913_009.htm
(quoting Dershowitz predicting "paradigm shift" in balancing of individual rights
and anti-terrorism, "Government will have greater freedom to conduct searches at
airports and elsewhere. There will be less access to public places.").
54. See Sepos, supra note 50, at 1 (quoting Kairys and examining American
willingness to give up freedoms in face of national security). Kairys pointedly
warned against racial profiling, stating, "Civil liberties don't mean a whole lot un-
less we extend them to everyone." Id. at 39.
55. For a discussion of foreign, primarily Israeli, methods, see infra notes 56-
66 and accompanying text.
56. See Uri Dan, Our Security Might Follow Israel's Hard Line, N.Y. POST, Sept. 17,
2001, at 22 (explaining El Al's rigorous security measures to prevent terrorism). In
a recent case, Israeli police identified a would-be bomber based on a profile of race
and appearance and thwarted the terrorist attack by tackling him as he boarded.
See id. (describing event and mentioning that such tactics will "clash with the cur-
rent American preoccupation with racial profiling").
57. See Nojeim, supra note 44, at 6 (reporting that some elements of El Al
profiling singles out "young, dark-skinned male[s]" and "Middle-Eastern looking
men with Western passports"); Weale, supra note 14, at P3 (unveiling some realities
of Israeli profiling systems). El Al's method of profiling uses race as one factor in
[Vol. 47: p. 451
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pected to be disproportionately involved in terrorism narrows the focus
enough to prevent it.58 Defenders of the practice are quick to point out
that, despite near war between Israel and the neighboring Middle Eastern
community, El Al has not had a hijacking in thirty years. 59 This expanded
power was deemed justified after the Israeli government officially declared
terrorist groups at war with Israel, a foreboding similarity to the current
declaration of war by Osama bin Laden against the United States and the
now common referral by the American government to a "war on
terrorism."
60
Other nations have mixed responses to racial measures. 6 1 Focusing
on airlines, other countries have security more lax than El A], but worlds
more secure than the United States. 62 European nations, as well as Israel,
use a tight screening system in hiring airport security as well as observing
passengers.
63
screening travelers, and many commentators differ on whether such a method
should be adopted in the United States. See id. (arguing further that El Al's system
should not be adopted in United States). Compare Rhee, supra note 13, at 875-76
(advocating personal aspect of El Al's system), with Smith, supra note 47, at 167-71
(1998) (expressing doubts about fairness of El Al's system).
58. See Dan, supra note 56, at 22 (describing nature of Israel's fear of terrorist
attacks stemming from specific groups that are deemed likely to attack Israel).
Importantly, El Al's expanded security scope looks specifically for members of ter-
rorist groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which necessarily skews its profiling system
toward Arabs and people with a Muslim background. See id. (reporting rationale
behind El Al and racial profiling).
59. See Weale, supra note 14, at P3 (noting that racial profiling in Israel "does
seem to work").
60. See id. (noting specificity that Israeli government uses to target race in
terrorist screening); Evan Thomas & Mark Hosenball, Bush: "We're at War", NEWS-
WEEK, Sept. 24, 2001, at 26 (reporting President Bush's unequivocal declaration,
"We're at war.").
61. See Weekend Edition-Sunday (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 16, 2001), availa-
ble at 2001 WL 7877395 (discussing successes and failures of Spanish and British
forays into racial methods to screen for terrorists). Harvard Professor Michael In-
gatieff described British methods of screening as fighting terror without losing lib-
erty but admitted that there was some "blow-back" for instituting measures that
targeted Irish men and women for no reason. See id. (warning of battle between
civil libertarians and police).
62. See Weale, supra note 14, at P3 (reporting that most Europeans will be
surprised to learn that measures such as "sky marshals" are not already in place in
United States). In the sky marshal plan, an armed federal agent flies on every
plane to thwart hijackers. See id. (reporting that sky marshals are about to be rein-
troduced by Federal Aviation Authority (FAA)); Hardball, supra note 10 (discussing
sky marshal plan with three U.S. Senators).
63. See Weale, supra note 14, at P3 (noting that all British airport security per-
sonnel are screened and trained by one government organization rather than each
airport and airline hiring its own employees). As a testament to at least compla-
cency regarding its profiling systems, Britain's Commission for Racial Equality re-
ports that it has not received any complaints about racial profiling. See id.
(reporting lack of problems with British profiling systems).
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Many predict that the United States will have to adopt an Israeli-type
security model. 64 One federal expert on terrorism asserts that " [p] rofiling
is the key; and the liberals will scream about it being racist."6 5 Despite any
such screaming, legislators are looking to foreign technique for guidance
on security standards. 6 6
C. Racial Profiling: Unreasonable Search and Seizure or
Racial Discrimination?
Even before the September l1th attacks, racial profiling spawned
much debate. 67 Racial profiling, as it is commonly understood, applies to
a broad range of racial discrimination by law enforcement that causes peo-
ple to be "singled out" based on race. 68 A great deal of the debate centers
on whether the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable in-
64. See, e.g., id. (implying that adoption of such measures was desirable but
noting that cost of such systems clashes both with American ideals and airline
bank-accounts); Dan, supra note 56, at 22 ("For years, U.S. airlines have resisted
the cost of such measures-but it's likely they will now have to revolutionize their
security systems along the Israeli model."); Pianin & Edsall, supra note 33, at All
("We ought to be aware of what the Israelis are doing and whether that's the sort
of thing we would do." (quoting William A. Niskanen of Cato Institute)); Hardball,
supra note 10 (interviewing Senators Max Cleland, John Kerry and John McCain,
who each spoke favorably about El Al and its security ideas).
65. See Weale, supra note 14, at P3 (quoting Gordon Rottman, United States
Special Operations Command expert on terrorism who supports more Israeli-type
security at airports).
66. See Hardball, supra note 10 (interviewing three senators about security
ideas); Hannity & Colmes, supra note 39 (interviewing Congressman John Kasich,
who, when asked if racial profiling was "in play," responded, "Everything's in place
that's going to guarantee the security of our country.").
67. See generally KENNETH MEEKS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: HIGHWAYS, SHOPPING
MALLS, TAXICABS, SIDEWALKS: How TO FIGHT BACK IF You ARE A VICTIM OF RACIAL
PROFILING (2000) (discussing historical and current racial profiling from actor
Danny Glover's inability to get taxicabs to governmental profiling, such as New
Jersey State Police profiling on highways); Knight & Kurnik, supra note 25, at 18-
22 (analyzing difficulties behind litigating racial profiling cases); David A. Harris,
Driving While Black-Racial Profiling On Our Nation's Highways, AMERICAN CIVIL LIB-
ERTIES UNION FREEDOM NETWORK, June 1999, at http://www.aclu.org/ profiling/
report/index.html (giving vivid depictions of individual occurrences of racial pro-
filing on U.S. highways and examining jurisprudence on racial profiling).
68. See Beck & Daly, supra note 25, at 597-98 (introducing basic concept of
racial profiling). Racial profiling, however, should not be confused with mere
"profiling," which is a practice that allows law enforcement to draw reasonable
inferences from the facts in light of experience and circumstances. See Knight &
Kurnick, supra note 25, at 17-18 (analogizing profiling in general to permissible
inferences allowed under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Tery allows police to
detain and lightly search individuals based on "reasonable suspicion," a standard
significantly less than probable cause but more than a mere "hunch." See Teny, 392
U.S. at 6-9, 27 (allowing limited searches when police have less than full probable
cause). Similarly, profiling alone has been defined as "a set of circumstances,
events, or behavior that... may cause heightened suspicion that affects an officer's
exercise of discretion." Knight & Kurnick, supra note 25, at 17.
[Vol. 47: p. 451
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trusion 69 or the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause offers
primary protection against stops, searches or detention based on race.70
In Whren, the United States Supreme Court significantly limited this
debate. 7 1 Police in an unmarked vehicle became suspicious of Michael
Whren when they saw him and another "youthful occupant" in a new truck
with temporary license plates in a "high drug area."'72 Police followed the
truck, stopped it for minor traffic violations, and found Whren with
drugs. 73 Whren challenged his resulting conviction under the Fourth
Amendment, claiming that the police suspected him because of his race
and were merely using the minor traffic violation as a pretext to stop and
search him for drugs.74 The Supreme Court held that although a tempo-
rary stop did constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, presence
of neutral reasons to believe a traffic violation had occurred renders a stop
reasonable ad hoc. 75 The Court rejected the argument that a stop might
be proven unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment by showing that
the police had a subjective racial motivation. 76
69. See U.S. CONST., amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated .. ").
70. See Beck & Daly, supra note 25, at 608 (addressing concerns that pretex-
tual stops facilitate racial profiling and examining public policy behind that prac-
tice); Knight & Kurnick, supra note 25, at 19 (stating that it is not yet clear to
litigants whether exclusionary rule would apply to Equal Protection Clause viola-
tions to suppress evidence that was obtained as result of violation).
71. See generally Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (finding that
Fourth Amendment could not invalidate search based on subjective racial intent).
72. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 808-09 (reciting facts behind Whren's traffic stop).
73. See id. at 808 (noting that traffic violations cited were failing to signal for
turn and proceeding at "unreasonable" speed through intersection).
74. See id. at 809-11 (reporting that Whren claimed officers could not have
had probable cause to believe anyone in truck was engaged in illegal drug activity).
The district court rejected Whren's challenge and the court of appeals affirmed,
stating that a police officer's subjective intentions do not matter as long as a rea-
sonable officer in the same circumstances could have stopped the car for sus-
pected traffic violations. See id. (summarizing lower court holdings).
75. See id. at 809-10 (beginning analysis with general summary of law sur-
rounding temporary stops).
76. See id. at 813-18 (holding that test for reasonable Fourth Amendment stop
was not based on subjective or actual motivations of officers involved but whether
probable cause existed for any violation). Whren argued that a police officer act-
ing reasonably (i.e., not using race) would not have made the stop for the given
reason. See id. at 810. Whren claimed that because traffic laws are so minutely
regulated, absolute compliance for a considerable period of time was nearly impos-
sible, allowing the police to "invariably be able to catch any given motorist in a
technical violation." See id. Thus, according to the defendant, if an officer's actual
intention based on racial discrimination could be masked with the pretext of a
minor traffic violation, a defendant proving this could prove the stop unreasona-
ble. See id. at 810-13 (citing Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (holding that
inventory search must not be "ruse" for "general rummaging" to find incriminat-
ing evidence), Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (allowing plaintiff to
show police officer "bad faith"), New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716-17, n.27
(1987) (finding that warrantless search did not appear to be "pretext" for ob-
13
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Broadly read, Whren represents an unwillingness to adjudge Fourth
Amendment reasonableness based on the motives of law enforcement in
searches and seizures and may leave all racially-motivated stops unassaila-
ble under the Fourth Amendment. 77 In the narrower reading, however,
Whren still leaves open a Fourth Amendment reasonableness challenge
when an officer uses race alone to tip the scales toward a stop. 78 Most
debaters agree that detention for no other reason than race would be a
rare occurrence.
79
tamining evidence), and Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980) (per curiam) (vali-
dating stop because "no evidence" that traffic citation was "pretext to confirm any
other previous suspicion about the occupants")). The Supreme Court dismissed
these cases as either deciding appropriateness of stops in the absence of probable
cause or refusing to deal with the question rather than answering it. See Whren, 517
U.S. at 811-12 (distinguishing precedent).
77. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 812 ("Not only have we never held . . . that an
officer's motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth
Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary."). More gen-
erally, the Court found outright "foreclos[ure of] any argument that the constitu-
tional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the
individual officers involved." Id. at 813. It added, "Subjective intentions play no
role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." Id.; see also Knight
& Kurnik, supra note 25, at 18 (reasoning that because Whren Court is unwilling to
look to subjective intentions, no racial profiling claim seems feasible under Fourth
Amendment, but noting that some courts allow showing subjective. use of race to
prove absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion).
The Court also disregarded the argument that police must adhere to a stan-
dard of practices that can determine objective Fourth Amendment reasonableness
and "root[ ] out pretext." See Whren, 517 U.S. at 815-16 (stating that argument
lacked support from case law but was mentioned in dicta). The basis of this argu-
ment was a police regulation that officers in unmarked vehicles should enforce the
traffic laws "only in the case of a violation that is so grave as to pose an immediate
threat to the safety of others." See id. at 815 (quoting Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment, Washington, D.C., General Order 303.1, pt. 1, Objectives and Policies (A)
(2) (4) (Apr. 30, 1992)). The Court determined that police standard practice var-
ies from place to place with such degree that, if found to test objective reasonable-
ness, it would give too much variance to Fourth Amendment protection. See id.
("We cannot accept that the search and seizure protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment are so variable.").
78. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 817-18 (stating that detailed balancing of all rele-
vant factors to determine Fourth Amendment reasonableness is necessary where
probable cause does not exist); Beck & Daly, supra note 25, at 605 (reasoning that
there must be at least appearance of minor infraction to validate racially motivated
detention). Presumably then, if the police used race as the predominant factor
without further reasons to make the stop, a balancing test could find the stop un-
reasonable. See Price v. Kramer, 200 F.3d 1237, 1256 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming
finding of Fourth Amendment violation where evidence showed that racial bias
alone precipitated stop without other reasons for detention).
79. See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual
Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial Profiling, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1409, 1414-16 (2000)
(arguing that probable cause and reasonable suspicion barrier does not limit of-
ficers' use of racial animus because of low threshold for those standards and high
number of small violations that will give officers needed neutral reasons to detain);
Sievert, supra note 13, at 1454-56 (reporting reality that police officers are taught
to consider any mention of race "taboo," making it more likely that other reasons
will be given to add to any proof of racial profiling).
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol47/iss2/5
2002] COMMENT
In some instances, relying on race has been found to be objectively
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In both United States v.
Brignoni-Ponces0 and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,8 1 the Supreme Court
allowed officers to overtly use race as a "relevant factor" in screening who
to detain and interrogate at the Mexican border.8 2 These decisions shrink
Fourth Amendment protection against racial profiling significantly amid a
perception of one racial group constituting a large amount of the
danger. 8
3
As a solution, the Whren Court made clear that the Equal Protection
Clause is the preferred cause of action for intentional racial discrimination
in a search or seizure. 84 The Court's decision was more reiteration than
revelation, however, because racial classification by government actors is
traditionally actionable as an equal protection claim.
85
80. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
81. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
82. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 563-64 (finding no constitutional violation
in detailed secondary inspection at Mexican San Clemente border checkpoint
"even if it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the basis of apparent
Mexican ancestry"); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886-87 (stating that "[t]he likeli-
hood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make
Mexican appearance a relevant factor," but could not stand alone in Border Pa-
trol's decisions to stop vehicles).
83. See Sievert, supra note 13, at 1453-55 (discussing Mexican border cases and
potential parallels with terrorist screening because of perception that people of
Arab ancestry are majority of those committing terrorist acts); Thompson, supra
note 41, at 974-78 (discussing willingness of Martinez-Fuerte and Brignoni-Ponce
Courts to allow use of race as overt factor).
84. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1998) (summarizing how
claims of racial profiling can be brought). The Court stated:
We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selec-
tive enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. But the
constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory applica-
tion of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.
Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis.
Id.
85. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227-28 (1995) (sum-
marizing equal protection jurisprudence dealing with racial discrimination).
Under the Equal Protection Clause, intentional classification based on race is in-
herently suspect, thus requiring "strict scrutiny" when challenged. See id. ("[W]e
hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
government actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.").
Strict scrutiny requires the government to show a "compelling" interest furthered
by "narrowly tailored" means to pass constitutional muster. See id. (explaining pa-
rameters of strict scrutiny).
15
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D. Wartime and National Security Crises and Their Effect on Equal
Protection Standards
The Equal Protection Clause has become the bane of purposeful ra-
cial discrimination.8 6 Under current equal protection jurisprudence, ra-
cial classification is only constitutional if the government (federal, state or
local) can prove that it is a narrowly tailored way to meet a compelling
interest, a standard known as "strict scrutiny."87 Assuming the racial classi-
fication is facially or intentionally used, race need only be one factor in a
governmental decision to fall under strict scrutiny.88 Cynically viewed as
86. See generally Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 534 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (describing racial discrimination as destructive of "the entire body
politic").
87. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (stating standards of racial discrimination by
state actors unequivocally). With the likelihood of increased federal security, pos-
sibly even federalizing airport personnel, it is important to note that federal, state
and local officials and legislators are all held to the same standards under the
Equal Protection Clause. Although the Fourteenth Amendment limitation on the
states is the Constitution's only provision that explicitly provides "equal protection
of the law," the Supreme Court, in Bolling v. Sharpe, held that the Fifth Amend-
ment shares an unwritten equal protection counterpart that limits the federal gov-
ernment in exactly the same way as the Fourteenth limits states. See Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) ("In view of [the] decision that the Constitution
prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would
be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Fed-
eral Government."). The holding in Bolling was not limited to educational racial
discrimination and Fourteenth Amendmentjurisprudence has been universally ap-
plied to Fifth Amendment equal protection reasoning. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at
216-18 (summarizing Bolling and reiterating equivalence of federal and state obli-
gations to refrain from racial discrimination); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
191-92 (1964) (treating Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment equal protection juris-
prudence as indistinguishable).
88. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66
(1977) (acknowledging rarity to have policy or decision based on one declarative
purpose of racial discrimination). Because this Comment is generally focusing on
situations where race is not the sole factor on which to detain those of Arab descent,
it is important to acknowledge that Arlington Heights allowed equal protection
claims to proceed under strict scrutiny as long as claimants show that "discrimina-
tory purpose is a motivating factor' found among other neutral factors. See id. (es-
tablishing possibility of invalidating method that is based on race in addition to
neutral factors); see also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 906-08 (1996) (applying "moti-
vating factor" standard to voter redistricting based in part on race). The Shaw
Court found that, although race-neutral factors (creating rural/urban districts and
preserving partisan politicking) were equally motivating, strict scrutiny applied be-
cause "the legislature subordinate[d] traditional race-neutral districting princi-
ples" to add racial considerations. See id. at 907 (quoting Miller v. Johnston, 515
U.S. 900, 916 (1995)). These cases illustrate that when race is behind part of a
decision, it need not be the "sole," "dominant" or "primary" factor to require strict
scrutiny. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66 (establishing that in addition to
sole reliance on race, it would be rare to find any particular purpose to be "domi-
nant" or "primary").
On the other hand, discriminatory impact alone is not sufficient to support an
equal protection claim. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 (holding that plaintiff
has burden of proving that discriminatory purpose was motivating factor in deci-
sion). This caveat of equal protection doctrine makes proof of intent the key start-
[Vol. 47: p. 451
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an impossible standard to meet, the Supreme Court recently assured law-
makers and litigators that strict scrutiny is not "fatal in fact," requiring a
highly sensitive, case-by-case, factual determination of compelling interest
and narrowly tailored means in each instance. 89
First, although most interests are assured to fall to equal protection
rigidity, war and national security have always been compelling interests. 90
In fact, the interests involved in protecting the nation during time of war
or great national threat have been used to directly override some of our
most protected freedoms. 91 Most congruent to the current political situa-
tion, in Korematsu, the Supreme Court held that the threat from Japanese
Americans after the attack on Pearl Harbor justified ordering them from
their homes and indefinitely interning them.92 The Court gave almost
ing point. For equal protection purposes, however, this Comment assumes that
race is either a clearly set out factor or that challengers can show intent to use race.
The intent requirement has been criticized as prohibiting many racial profiling
cases because reliance on race by an officer or a department is difficult to conclu-
sively discover. See, e.g., Beck & Daly, supra note 25, at 612-18 (noting difficulty in
proving equal protection violations). Significantly for equal protection litigants,
however, the Arlington Heights Court did note that discriminatory impact could be
used as circumstantial evidence of intent to discriminate. See Arlington Heights, 429
U.S. at 270 (reiterating disallowance of disparate impact claims under equal pro-
tection claims but not excluding evidence of disparate impact altogether).
89. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (dispelling "the notion that strict scrutiny is
'strict in theory, but fatal in fact"' (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519
(1980))). Adarand held that even though a racial classification may be intended to
benefit a disadvantaged race, this "benign" status does not lessen the scrutiny it
receives. See id. at 227 (holding that ensuring personal right of equal protection
does not square with benign group classifications). Instead, Adarand held that af-
firmative action or racial distinction intended to remedy past discrimination could
indeed be a compelling interest met with narrow means. See id. (stating all racial
classifications to be treated same under equal protection analysis). Thus the Court
justified its application of strict scrutiny to even remedial racial classifications by
assuring litigants that strict scrutiny simply applied to "differentiate between per-
missible and impermissible governmental use of race." See id. at 228-29 (distin-
guishing Justice Steven's arguments in concurrence).
90. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307-08 (1981) (validating restriction on
interstate travel and free speech on ground that person restricted is likely to cause
threat to national security by compromising intelligence operations). The Court
reiterated that national security could allow quite large ranges of regulation:
It is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling
than the security of the Nation. Protection of the foreign policy of the
United States is a governmental interest of great importance, since for-
eign policy and national security considerations cannot neatly be
compartmentalized.
Id. at 307 (citing Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964); Cole v.
Young, 351 U.S. 536, 546 (1956); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965)).
91. See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAws BUT ONE-CIVIL LIBER-
TIES IN WARTIME (1998) (outlining war-time interest subjugation of rights from
Abraham Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus to internment of World War II).
92. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-23 (1944) (affirming
Korematsu's conviction for failing to submit to evacuation order that excluded
Japanese Americans from "the West Coast war area" even though many of them
lived and worked there). The evacuation order also required Korematsu and hun-
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carte blanche discretion to the government in protecting the country in
time of national emergency or war, stating that even though racial discrim-
ination required strict scrutiny, the government had met its burden in
proving a compelling interest.93 Despite all its criticism, including a rabid
dissent and a subsequent congressional resolution passed to denounce the
internment and provide reparations to descendants of those imprisoned,
the Korematsu reasoning has never been overturned. 94 Korematsu stands as
the only evidence of what might happen when prevention of racial dis-
crimination directly conflicts with national security and war-time inter-
dreds of other Japanese Americans to report to "assembly centers" that served as
processing areas for movement to "relocation centers" for an indefinite period. See
id. at 221-22 (summarizing order and its three parts); see also Saito, supra note 33,
at 3-11 (recounting facts and flaws in historical internment narrative). The Kore-
matsu Court did separate the failure to evacuate from the failure to report to an
assembly center and the failure to submit to relocation in "concentration camps,"
only expressly ruling on the order for Japanese Americans to leave their homes.
See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 222-23 (discussing order). The Court, however, de-
fended each of the practices as within the power of the government in time of war,
stating:
Regardless of the true nature of the assembly and relocation centers-
and we deem it unjustifiable to call them concentration camps with all
the ugly connotations that term implies-we are dealing specifically with
nothing but an exclusion order. To cast this case into outlines of racial
prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were
presented, merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from
the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded
because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because properly consti-
tuted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt
constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided
that . . .all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West
Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence
in this time of war in our military leaders-as inevitably it must-deter-
mined that they should have the power to do just this.
Id. at 223.
93. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 ("[C]ourts must subject [racial classifica-
tions] to the most rigid scrutiny."). Korematsu was among the first cases to ex-
pressly refer to racial discrimination as requiring modern strict scrutiny, but its
application is notoriously deferential to military interests. The Court stated:
Nothing short of apprehension by the proper military authorities of the
gravest imminent danger to the public safety can constitutionally justify
[exclusion based on race].... The military authorities, charged with the
primary responsibility of defending our shores, concluded that [lesser
measures] provided inadequate protection and ordered exclusion.
Id. at 218. The Court continued that the war with the Japanese Empire required
placing confidence in government officials to have the power to make decisions
that will best protect the country. See id. at 223 (citing public need to defer to
government/military determinations in times of grave threat).
94. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("Such exclusion
goes over the very brink of constitutional power and falls into the ugly abyss of
racism."); see also Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, § 2(a), 102 Stat.
903 (1988) ("The Congress recognizes that.., a grave injustice was done to both
citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry by the evacuation, re-
location, and internment of civilians during World War II.").
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ests. 95 Moreover, as recently as 1995, the Supreme Court continued to
cite Korematsu at least partially as valid law. 96 It is not lost on legal scholars
that the ghost of Korematsu might be resurrected at any time, possibly in
less outrageous increment, given a sufficient threat by a specific racial
group.97
95. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(issuing writ of coram nobis vacating Korematsu's conviction based on new factual
evidence, but reminding litigants that Supreme Court's 1944 ruling was still con-
trolling precedent by stating, "The Supreme Court's [Korematsu] decision stands as
the law of this case"); Saito, supra note 33, at 9-12 (reporting validity of Korematsu
decision and failure of any measure to "right the wrong" of Japanese internment
or eliminate the risk of similar occurrence in future); Alfred C. Yen, Introduction:
Praising with Faint Damnation-The Troubling Rehabilitation of Korematsu, 40 B.C. L.
REv. 1, 2 (1998) ("[P]roclaimations of Korematsu's permanent discrediting are pre-
mature. The Supreme Court has never overruled the case. It stands as valid prece-
dent, an authoritative interpretation of our Constitution and the 'supreme Law of
the Land."' (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1)). Gossamer wisps of this deference
to government and military decisions regarding national security string through-
out current case law. For example, holding that U.S. soldiers had no constitu-
tional claims for damages for involuntary drug experimentation, the Court
reasoned that "congressionally uninvited intrusion into military affairs by the judi-
ciary is inappropriate." See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 681-83 (1987)
(disallowing constitutional tort actions for damages when violations arose "inci-
dent to service").
96. SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 214-16 (1995) (refer-
ring to Korematsu's scrutiny standard); see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 344-45
n.30 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining Korematsu as supporting blanket
exclusions without individual determinations, but distinguishing Korematsu as
product of "exigencies of war"). Justice Stevens noted that the Court should pro-
ceed with "extreme caution" when asked to permit such measures in light of the
congressional condemnation of the Japanese internment. See Flores, 507 U.S. at
344-45 n.30 (implying that racially-based internment would fail under today's
equal protection scrutiny).
97. See REHNQUIST, supra note 91, at 202-11, 218-25 (discussing Japanese in-
ternment, defending deference to military decisions in wartime and describing
Korematsu's legal reasoning as upholding maxim "Inter arma silent leges. In time of
war the laws are silent"); see also Dean Masaru Hashimoto, The Legacy of Korematsu
v. United States: A Dangerous Narrative Retold, 4 AsIAN PAc. AM. LJ. 72, 74 (1996)
("[W]hile public narratives about the Japanese internment have changed mark-
edly, the Korematsu case remains consistent with modern legal doctrines and may
lead to repetition of similar governmental actions."); Saito, supra note 33, at 11-25
(describing "racing" of Arabs as terrorists as akin to Japanese internment and
equating logic and dangers of threat in World War II to threat from terrorist emer-
gency). It is difficult to imagine ordering Arab-Americans into concentration
camps, but less invasive measures might be justified by national emergency arising
from an identifiable racial group, notwithstanding general distaste for Korematsu
style internments. See REHNQUIST, supra note 91, at 211 (stating that military fear of
attack and sabotage byJapanese loyalists seems "legally adequate" to justify treating
two classes of "enemy aliens" differently). Already, Supreme Court decisions that
allow screening based on race seem, at least in part, to be based on a showing that
a disproportionate number of the racial group are involved in a crime. See, e.g.,
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 551-53 (1976) (citing dispropor-
tionately large number of illegal immigrants from Mexico in upholding ability of
Border Patrol agents to selectively question car occupants based on "apparent
Mexican ancestry"). Further, the Martinez-Fuerte Court outrightly extolled a utilita-
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Other highly protected rights also have fallen to compelling national
security and war-time interests. 98 With many parallels to the war on terror-
ism, the war on drugs has been held a compelling enough interest to abro-
gate Fourth Amendment rights.99 Especially concerning "state sponsored
terrorism," First Amendment protection has also been qualifiedly limited
by a compelling interest in national security. 10 0
On the other hand, the level of specificity applied to find a compel-
ling national security interest is unclear. 10 1 In Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education,'0 2 the Supreme Court required "particularized" investigation
into a remedial protection of minority teacherjobs, stating that an "amor-
rian justification for racial profiling by holding that because 20% of vehicles sub-
jected to extended questioning contained illegal immigrants then, "to the extent
that the Border Patrol relies on apparent Mexican ancestry ... that reliance clearly
is relevant to the law enforcement need to be served." See id. at 564 n.17 (drawing
conclusions from arrest statistics provided by border patrol).
98. See REHNQUIST, supra note 91, at 11-25 (detailing suspension of habeas
corpus by President Lincoln during Civil War and Lincoln's view that one law
should be violated before all U.S. laws went unexecuted because government fell).
99. See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66,
670 (1989) (holding that because of importance in seizing illegal drugs and Cus-
toms Service's critical role in war on drugs, government's compelling interest al-
lowed drug testing that was outside protection of Fourth Amendment).
Ominously, the Supreme Court cited the danger of airline hijacking to provide
compelling interest to search outside the Fourth Amendment and stated that
"[w]here ... the possible harm against which the Government seeks to guard is
substantial, the need to prevent its occurrence furnishes an ample justification for
reasonable searches calculated to advance the Government's goal." Id. at 674-75;
see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 618-21 (1989) (finding
that governmental "special needs" can out-balance privacy interests of individuals
and allowing railroad employee searches without individualized suspicion); Nat'l
Treasury Employees Union v. Unites States Customs Serv., 27 F.3d 623, 630 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (finding that "extraordinary and costly" drug war was compelling gov-
ernmental interest that outweighed privacy interests in being free from intrusive
drug testing for employees); AFGE v. Dole, 670 F. Supp. 445, 448-49 (D.D.C. 1987)
(allowing suspicionless searches of federal employees whose positions relate to na-
tional security), affd, 885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
100. See Farrakhan v. Reagan, 669 F. Supp. 506, 510-12 (D.D.C. 1987) (hold-
ing that ending state-sponsored terrorism was compelling interest to justify eco-
nomic isolation of Libya that interfered with both free speech and free exercise of
religious organizations that traveled and sent money to Libya), affd without opinion,
851 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d
1205, 1212-13 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (denying preliminary injunction of Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act because it served compelling interest in "national
security and foreign policy" that outweighed plaintiff's right to political association
and expression), aff'd 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Humanitarian Law
Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1193 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ("Without question, the
government's interest in national security is a compelling one, permitting the gov-
ernment to impose restrictions on citizens' ability to maintain associations with
foreign entities.").
101. For a full discussion of the level of particularity courts require to find a
compelling interest, see supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text and infra notes
102-06, 147-75 and accompanying text.
102. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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phous" interest in remedying "societal discrimination" could not be com-
pelling. 10 3 In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,'0 4 the Court supported
"the most searching judicial inquiry" and a "clearly articulat[ed] need and
basis" to determine a compelling interest behind allowing a minority
favoring contracting program. 10 5 These cases seem to extol the idea that
a compelling interest cannot be a broad overarching concept, but only in
rare circumstances does a court define the national security interest in
such specific terms.
10 6
Second, for race-based governmental action to be narrowly tailored,
the Court has invoked differing, sometimes unpredictable, levels of scru-
tiny.' 0 7 Generally, the means employed must "substantially address" or be
"necessary" to accomplish the compelling interest, often without alterna-
tive race-neutral means of accomplishment.10 8 Earlier reasoning, espe-
cially analysis of the exigencies of war and national security, found the
Court deferring to a governmental decision that the measure adopted is
necessary.10 9 More recent jurisprudence, however, applies excruciating
103. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-76 (holding that such broad standard could
not support legal remedies that "work against innocent people").
104. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
105. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229, 236 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 545 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Rezaq, 899 F. Supp. 697, 708 (D.D.C. 1995)
(narrowing compelling national security interest as "compelling interest in protect-
ing both the secrecy of information important to our national security and the
appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign
intelligence service" (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 175 (1985))).
107. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 915 (1996) (acknowledging that Su-
preme Court's decisions "have not always provided precise guidance on how
closely the means (the racial classification) must serve the end (the justification or
compelling interest)").
108. See id. (stating of Court's narrowly tailored reasoning, "[W]e have always
expected that [the means] would substantially address, if not achieve, the avowed
purpose"); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (holding that although pro-
tecting children in custody battle is compelling interest, deciding which parent
gets custody based on race is not "necessary to the accomplishment" of that pur-
pose (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964))); Fullilove, 448
U.S. at 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Racial classifications are simply too perni-
cious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and classi-
fication."); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding that racially
discriminatory marriage laws are not "necessary" to any legitimate state interest).
109. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944) (giving full
credit to claims by military that such measures were needed because of timeliness
of threat of "real military dangers"); see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.
81, 100-04 (1943) (upholdingJapanese curfew imposed because military claimed it
feared sabotage and espionage). The Hirabayashi Court stated:
We may assume that [the racial classifications here would be a violation of
equal protection] were it not for the fact that the danger of espionage
and sabotage, in time of war and of threatened invasion, calls upon the
military authorities to scrutinize every relevant fact bearing on the loyalty
of populations in the danger areas.
Id. at 100. The Court further stated that it need not investigate the action taken
further than needed to find a "reasonable basis." See id. at 101-02.
21
Braber: Korematsu's Ghost: A Post-September 11th Analysis of Race and Nat
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
factual investigations into the level of racial-classification that might be ap-
propriate, including efficacy of alternatives, strong bases in evidence and
balancing interests of those affected. 110 Most importantly, when race is
the center of the problem, a racial classification can be found to be nar-
rowly tailored. 111
III. COMBINING THE STANDARDS: NATIONAL SECURITY NEEDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR RACIALLY PROFILED ARABS
The current political environment lends itself to an onslaught of ra-
cial profiling that will subject those of Middle Eastern descent and appear-
ance to added searches, detentions and scrutiny. 112 Faced with this
environment and low political standing, those alleging racial profiling
must turn to existing legal standards for protection. 113 Little utility in
watered-down Fourth Amendment doctrine will force racial profiling into
other constitutional arenas-primarily equal protection.1 14 Although ra-
cial classification is almost per se invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause, constitutional standards are traditionally deferential to national se-
curity interests, and will be especially so in light of the recent terrorist
attacks, existing threat and ongoing war.1 15 Thus, equal protection
reaches a rare impasse between two cherished constants, denouncement
of racial discrimination and deference to the government during times of
110. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506-08 (1989)
(finding that City of Richmond's plan to award 30% of dollar amount of each
contract to minority contractors was not narrowly tailored to compelling interest of
remedying past discrimination because Richmond did not show that it had consid-
ered race-neutral means to increase minority business participation); see also
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171-85 (1987) (holding that district court
order to promote corporals based on race was narrowly tailored). The Paradise
Court further stated that a race-based remedy of past discrimination was limited by
the interests of affected parties (there white troopers seeking promotion) that the
issuing court must balance in adopting its race-based solution. See id. at 184-85.
(upholding district court's balancing of interests in deciding what remedy to im-
pose). Although Paradise evaluated a court ordered race-based policy, the Paradise
factors apply to officially adopted racial plans as well. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 507-09
(applying Paradise factors as general test for any race-conscious action).
111. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (hold-
ing that when race-based action is necessary to further compelling interest, race-
based plan can satisfy "narrow tailoring" test). This "necessary" race-based argu-
ment is today most often seen in remedial plans to correct past racial discrimina-
tion. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 167 (finding that pervasive past discriminatory
conduct justified narrowly tailored racially-based employment policy).
112. For a discussion on the likelihood of and the theories behind any racially
sensitive methods adopted to fight terrorism, see infra notes 119-34 and accompa-
nying text.
113. For a discussion on the political safeguards afforded Arabs and Arab-
Americans, see infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
114. For a discussion of the failure of the Fourth Amendment to offer protec-
tion against racial profiling, see infra notes 135-46 and accompanying text.
115. For a discussion of war and national security and their effect on equal
protection standards, see infra notes 147-227 and accompanying text.
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crisis.1 16 The standards and policies behind current equal protection doc-
trine, however, should be interpreted so that scrutiny of racial measures
cannot be applied with variant force depending on the interests involved,
but rather must remain consistently tight to avoid unnecessary affronts to
racial equality through amorphous goals and overbroad means. 117 Thus,
though wartime and national security interests do command an impor-
tance rarely matched, these interests should not simply grant the govern-
ment a free pass to target Arabs merely because it sees fit., 1 8
A. Security At All Costs: The Current Political Atmosphere Paves
the Way for Racial Profiling
The United States' political community now seems eager to sacrifice
its squeamishness to racial profiling to the patriotic mantra of heightened
security.1 1 9 Despite significant vocal opposition, very little stands to stop
the political system from expanding law enforcement power to validly use
race in terrorist screening.1
20
The extent that Arabs already have been targeted for terrorist activity
creates a background of prejudice that may be amplified in the current
crisis. 121 Indeed, some anti-terrorism legislation adopted before Septem-
ber 11, 2001 was already feared unfairly skewed to target Middle Eastern
airline passengers. 122 The current threat will serve only to fuel such
feeling.
116. For a discussion of the deference given to government and military by
courts, see infra notes 147-227 and accompanying text.
117. For a discussion of the arguments behind levels of particularity and dif-
fering standards of scrutiny, see infra notes 147-228 and accompanying text.
118. For a discussion of the full policies that require constitutional protec-
tion, even in times of war, see infra notes 177-237 and accompanying text.
119. For a discussion of the facts and theories behind the current political
feelings, see supra notes 33-85 and accompanying text.
120. For a discussion of the facts behind the political movement toward
screening those of Arab descent, see supra notes 33-54, 67-85 and accompanying
text.
121. See Michael Higgins, Looking the Part, A.B.A.J., Nov., 1997, at 48 (discuss-
ing rise of bias parallel to rise of criminal profiling in terrorist searches); Saito,
supra note 33, at 11-15 (documenting "racing" of Arab-Americans as terrorists as
similar to Japanese internment); Sievert, supra note 13, at 1454-56 (discussing like-
lihood of race being used surreptitiously by officers because of "litany of Islamic
terrorist acts" as of Winter 2000). Sievert himself admitted the realities behind this
feeling, stating that Arab terrorism "has arguably constituted a continuous global
conflict." Id.
122. See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 33, at 11 (finding that targeting of racial
groups pursuant to anti-terrorism measures has "corroding effect" on community's
attempts to homogenize socially or politically); see also Nojeim, supra note 44, at 7
(analyzing recently adopted computerized profiling system and its disparate im-
pact on Arabs). Gregory T. Nojeim, legislative counsel to the ACLU in Washing-
ton D.C., reports that the Department of Justice had defended such disparate
impact as "not unjustified" but stated that it would closely monitor the impact
level. See id. at 8 (reviewing Department ofJustice report and noting that Depart-
ment did not establish what level of disparate impact would be unacceptable).
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Further, while previous terrorist attacks were often performed by non-
Arabs, the September lth attacks by nineteen Middle Eastern men, the
almost daily threats of more violence from Arab extremists, and the ongo-
ing war in Afghanistan thrusts an identifiable racial group into the spot-
light.1 2 3 According to most advocates of racial profiling, the likelihood
that someone of Arabic descent will attempt further terrorism is the most
compelling argument for security expanded to take race into account.' 2 4
In response, lawmakers' and officials' obvious desperation to create a
tighter, safer security regime points to inadequate protection against racial
profiling. 12
5
Traditional opposition to racial measures and fairly universal distaste
of decisions based solely on race, however, should serve to curb any ex-
The use of indefinite detention and "secret evidence" against those deemed a
threat to national security is also highly criticized as facilitating the targeting of
Arabs as terrorists. See Saito, supra note 33, at 15-21 (illustrating freedom to use
racial bias and its evil effects when there are no requirements that reasons be given
for detention or charges be brought). See generally MichaelJ. Whidden, Note, Une-
qual Justice: Arabs in America and United States Terrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2825 (2001) (exploring history, application and ramifications of Anti-terror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996), which codified use of secret evidence and indefinite detention).
123. See Nightline: Profile, supra note 16 (discussing likelihood of greater scru-
tiny of three million Arabs in United States because of racial identity of September
1lth hijackers).
124. See, e.g., Newshour, supra note 43 (interviewing several civil rights experts
on whether "at any time" racial profiling can be acceptable). One commentator
asserted, "[T]he only mass movement in the world that we know of that includes
[numerous] people who are interested in mass murdering Americans by hijacking
airplanes ... are adherents to this perversion of Islam that centers in the Middle-
East." Id. (quoting Newsweek and National Journal writer, Stuart Taylor).
One of the greatest fears surrounds an attack by biological agent, possibly the
most insidious of all possible future terrorist events. See generally Barry Kellman,
Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing Catastrophe, 24 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 417 (2001) (analyzing bio-terrorism in depth, who may attack and why, what
pathogens might be used, how an attack might be devised and what law enforce-
ment measures might be viable to prevent such terrorism). Such fears are intensi-
fied given the relatively minor, but nevertheless widespread release of the anthrax
bacteria in U.S. cities in the weeks following the September 11th attacks. See CNN:
Investigators Report "No Clues" in Latest Anthrax Death, Nov. 1, 2001, at http://
www.cnn.com/2001/ HEALTH/conditions/11/01/anthrax/index.html (report-
ing results of investigation and reviewing previous anthrax incidents).
125. See America United, supra note 39 (questioning Attorney General John
Ashcroft about racial profiling, who would not deny use of race as one of group of
factors in new security regime); see also Pianin & Edsall, supra note 33, at All (re-
porting that congressional leaders outright favor "re-balancing" of civil rights and
national security). Compare Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Ap-
propriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (providing broad sweeping police search and de-
tain powers), with Nightline: Profile, supra note 16 (reporting that racial profiling
may be already occurring by detention of hundreds of Middle Easterners de-
scribed as "ethnic profiling on a massive scale" caused by new push for tighter
security).
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treme uses of race.1 26 Most likely, the forms that racial profiling will take
are the types most often adopted in security regimes, using race expressly
as an added criterion in a multi-factor system and implicitly as a starting
point under broad enforcement discretion. 127 Profiling of this type raises
much less opposition, especially with legislators and officials already sensi-
tive to greater security needs.' 28 Therefore, the danger of racially-based
detentions is immediate and may not be obvious to non-victims.
Finally, given that the overwhelming majority of people in the United
States support at least some heightened scrutiny of those of apparent Arab
descent,1 29 the democratic oversight of the government will likely not pre-
vent use of race in terrorist screening.130 The racial minorities who find
themselves detained, searched or seized based on race have no avenue for
protection, save the Court. 31 Indeed, the risk of such tyranny of the ma-
jority is intensified, because even though alien residents in the United
126. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan,J., dissent-
ing) (expressing one of earliest opinions that government is limited to race-neutral
methods, "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens."). Justice Harlan later added, "[T] he common government of all
shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law."
Id. at 560; see also Beck & Daly, supra note 25, at 608 (noting that few advocates
suggest using race alone for suspicion); Sievert, supra note 13, at 1453 ("The law is
clear as to the general prohibition against objective reliance solely upon race and
ethnicity in law enforcement decisions.") (emphasis added).
127. See Dan, supra note 56, at 22 (discussing Israeli airline El Al's practices
and predicting that United States' similarity of dangers requires adoption of Israeli
model); see also Nojeim, supra note 44, at 6 (reporting multi-factor elements of El
A] profiling include "young, dark-skinned male[s]" and "Middle-Eastern looking
men with Western passports"). For a further discussion of this issue, see supra
notes 34-51 and accompanying text.
128. See Sievert, supra note 13, at 1453-56 (arguing that race and ethnicity can
be overtly considered as one "relevant factor" and that public must understand
that when law enforcement officers "occasionally consider ethnic background" it is
sometimes defensible); Thompson, supra note 41, at 1005-06 (asserting that when
race constitutes "an essential element" in determining criminal activity, such as
organization/gang membership or border searches, it could be considered among
other factors); America United, supra note 39 (broadcasting Attorney General Ash-
croft's feeling that any factors "that elevate any suspicion" will be used). For a
further discussion on the feelings of legislators and policy makers, see supra notes
33-42 and accompanying text.
129. See Sepos, supra note 50, at 39 (reporting public poll results that over-
whelmingly favor special scrutiny of Arabs).
130. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)
(reasoning that racial prejudice may "tend seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities"); see
also Gregory P. Magarian, Toward Political Safeguards of Self-Determination, 46 VILL. L.
REv. 1219, 1219-21 (2001) (discussing state and federal structures for allowing po-
litical protection of individual personal freedoms and proposing that some politi-
cal safeguards are insufficient to provide complete self-determination).
.131. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4 (finding that Court must protect
"discrete and insular minorities" when their political process power has been
eliminated).
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States are afforded constitutional protections, their political representa-
tion is practically nil. 132
This political environment opens the door to racial discrimination.1 33
It is a situation that in many ways mirrors the struggle that initiated the
events behind Korematsu and points to inevitable use of race in the ongo-
ing war against terrorism.134
B. The Fourth Amendment's Failure: Insufficient Protection Against Racial
Profiling Claims in Terrorist Screening
As the racially profiled turn to the courts for some remedy, they must
meet the legal standards for protection. 135 For a variety of reasons, the
Fourth Amendment will offer little protection against use of race as a fac-
tor in the search for terrorists. 136
The scenario that posits race as one among several reasons that to-
gether justify the stop can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in
three ways. First, such a policy will no doubt be a direct application of the
theory that one race poses a disproportionate threat and, as such, will be
backed by the existence of Middle Eastern terrorist cells.13 7 It is the
Fourth Amendment that is most susceptible to such a theory, since the
Supreme Court in Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte indicated that the like-
lihood of an individual of certain ancestry being involved in a certain
crime was enough to make that ancestry an "objective criterion" to reason-
able detention. 138 Second, multi-criteria racial policies can also be justi-
132. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (providing that those who
have lawfully entered United States have same Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights as citizens). But see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264-71
(1990) (holding that not all aliens are "the people" under the Fourth Amend-
ment); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-81 (1976) (discussing "plenary power doc-
trine" allowance of treatment of citizens and aliens differently). For a further
discussion on the legal rights of aliens in the United States, see supra notes 30-32
and accompanying text.
133. See generally Saito, supra note 33 (predicting possibility that Arabs "raced"
as terrorists could become victims of racial discrimination).
134. See id. at 3-7, 11-15 (discussing similarities in "internment narrative" and
current plight of Arabs in America).
135. For a discussion of the legal standards behind racial profiling and racial
classifications, see supra notes 67-111 and accompanying text.
136. For a discussion of the Fourth Amendment's protection against Arab ter-
rorist profiling, see infra notes 137-49 and accompanying text.
137. See Sievert, supra note 13, at 1453-56 (discussing scenario where informa-
tion actually received by government depicted terrorist cell made up of Arab ex-
tremists and exploring legitimacy of racially-based response to such threat).
138. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563-64 (1976) (al-
lowing limited inspection at Mexican border even if largely based on Mexican an-
cestry); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975)
(stating race might be one "relevant factor" to make search reasonable under
Fourth Amendment). Although dealing with Mexicans on the Texas/Mexico bor-
der, the border cases share significant parallels with the current war on terrorism.
According to legal scholars, the Court's allowance of race as a factor for a reasona-
ble search, even though it recognized that a vast majority of Mexicans were not
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fled as searching for specific descriptions of Islamic terrorists, which has
also been held a reasonable use of race. 139 Especially because the FBI list
of Islamic-terrorists possesses the commonality of Middle Eastern descent,
an objectively reasonable policy could conceivably be promulgated to
search for specific people with general criteria-such as race-that would
be untouchable through the Fourth Amendment. 140 Third, because
Whren eliminates consideration of racial motivations when neutral reasons
otherwise justify the stop, officers using race as one criterion have the op-
portunity to show that other factors provided sufficient suspicion.1
4
'
Additionally, racial profiling as a result of the expansion of police
power to search and detain, implicitly allowing law enforcement to use
race to initiate suspicion, is similarly unprotected by the Fourth Amend-
ment. Under a broad reading of Whren, the Fourth Amendment can never
be used to challenge subjective intent and even intentional reliance solely
on race would lie outside Fourth Amendment protection. 142 Even Whren's
illegal immigrants, opens up the use of race to other arenas of law enforcement.
See Sievert, supra note 13, at 1451-56 (discussing border cases and their application
in post-September 11th attack United States, where it would be understood that
not all of one nationality were terrorists, but likelihood was sufficiently high to
consider ancestry); Thompson, supra note 41, at 975-78, 1005-08 (discussing bor-
der cases and using them to support valid use of race as "[one] factor in the quan-
tum of suspicion").
139. See United States v. Kim, 25 F.3d 1426, 1431 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding
that race may constitute "parallelism between a detained and a previously de-
scribed suspect") (citing United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211 (1983)).
140. See id. (explaining that race could be considered along with height, age
and location).
141. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811-14 (1996) (finding that
where probable cause existed to believe traffic law has been violated, fact that of-
ficers also considered race was insufficient to render stop unreasonable). Al-
though Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte were based on statistics that tend to
predominate studied and adopted policies, Whren would protect an individual of-
ficer's subjective use of race among other criteria. If race is simply one of an of-
ficer's reasons, a court will not be able to practically decide that the detention
would have been unreasonable without the single use of race. See Oliver, supra
note 79, at 1414 (arguing that because standards of probable cause and reasonable
suspicion are based largely on observance and experience, use of race can easily be
hidden among other reasons to detain). For example, a stop made based on race,
traveling habits and nervous behavior would not be objectively unreasonable be-
cause it could be made only based on traveling habits and nervous behavior. See
Beck & Daly, supra note 25, at 608 (explaining how Whren causes minorities to be
detained disproportionately).
142. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 ("We think [case law] foreclose[s] any argu-
mient that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual
motivations of the individual officers involved."); Knight & Kurnik, supra note 25,
at 18 (arguing that "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not provide an open avenue
for challenging racially motivated stops and arrests because of the objective stan-
dard set forth in Whren, which does not require an analysis of the officer's intent or
motive"). Indeed, courts have read Whren to only allow proof of racial discrimina-
tion if it is part of showing lack of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. See, e.g.,
Price v. Kramer, 200 F.3d 1237, 1249-51 (9th Cir. 2000) (allowing evidence of ra-
cial bias to prove absence of probable cause). Such showings, however, might not
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narrowest reading, however, offers little more protection. 143 If subjective
intent may not be analyzed in the presence of neutral factors that show a
properly made detention, the variant, unpredictable behavior patterns
and signals that can tip agents off to a terrorist make stops based on race
easy to cover.144 Thus, more dangerously, as police power to detain and
search is expanded, Whren's refusal to look at racial intentions becomes an
absolute cover for racial profiling because law enforcement will have an
extremely low threshold for reasonable detention. 145 Although Wren's
Fourth Amendment window already provides very limited protection, with
an expansion of power to detain, that minuscule protection becomes non-
existent.146
C. Korematsu Reborn: A Compelling Interest Too Easily Met
Because it is intentional racial classification, racial discrimination in
terrorist screening or security procedures must be analyzed pursuant to
equal protection standards, which are historically deferential to justifica-
tions based on national security, wartime threats and military needs.'
47
Seeing limits to Fourth Amendment protection against racial profiling,
the Whren Court magnanimously reminded litigants that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause was the more viable method for challenging official action
based on race.1 48 Although correct in sentiment, Whren's condolence that
"the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on con-
siderations such as race" is oversimplified.' 4 9 Though unwavering in its
application of strict scrutiny against racial classification, the Supreme
invoke the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. See Sievert, supra note 13, at
1453 (positing that, given Whren's language invalidating all use of subjective intent,
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule might not apply even when it is clear that
race was sole factor precipitating stop).
143. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 817-18 (implying that without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion, balancing reasonableness of stop might take race into ac-
count); Oliver, supra note 79, at 1410-16 (arguing from narrow reading of Whren
that probable cause alone shields officer who has used race for suspicion).
144. See Saito, supra note 33, at 15-21 (discussing various ambiguous terms
that have been used to detain those "suspected of terrorism," some of criteria un-
available because of practice of using "secret evidence"); see also Nojeim, supra note
44, at 4-5 (discussing computerized terrorist profiling system that takes account of
forty secret pieces of data that might tip off officials to terrorist); Rhee, supra note
13, at 865 (detailing government's unwillingness to disclose what criteria are con-
sidered in screening of terrorists).
145. See Beck & Daly, supra note 25, at 597-601 (warning of danger "pretext"
stops even through fairly identifiable standards of traffic violations).
146. For a discussion of the minimal protection, see supra notes 140-44 and
accompanying text.
147. See Knight & Kurnik, supra note 25, at 19 (outlining equal protection
claims as "most direct constitutional avenue" for racial profiling).
148. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 ("[T]he constitutional basis for objecting to
intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not
the Fourth Amendment.").
149. See id. (summarizing Constitution's treatment of racial classification).
[Vol. 47: p. 451
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol47/iss2/5
2002] COMMENT
Court's holding in Adarand unequivocally establishes that strict scrutiny
can be met. 150 Adarands insistence on applying strict scrutiny to a benign
contract plan aimed at remedying discrimination garnered its support pri-
marily by assuring strict scrutiny was not the death knell to every racially-
based plan. 1
5
'
Given the assurance from Adarand that all racial classification is ana-
lyzed under the same passable standard, a compelling government interest
must stand behind intentional racial terrorist screening-regardless of the
rationale behind it.1 52 No doubt the argument will sound that the current
threat looms so large and that national security is in such dire crisis that
absolute racial equality can be sacrificed to provide this needed compel-
ling interest. 1
53
With war and surrounding national security concerns long heralded
without question as the ultimate government interests, courts do not usu-
ally require any great degree of particularity in determining the "compel-
ling" prong. 154 Thus, the standard often exists in a vacuum and could be
150. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (assur-
ing that strict scrutiny is not "fatal in fact").
151. See id. (noting that in past, every Justice on Court has agreed that reme-
dying prior discrimination could be compelling interest met with narrowly tailored
program) (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987)). Thus, the
previously used less-intensive scrutiny for benign racial classifications was aban-
doned in favor of passable strict scrutiny for all racial classifications. See id. at 227
(overruling Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)).
152. See id. at 237-39 (remanding case to lower court to find "compelling"
rather than "significant" governmental purpose). The varying degrees of "compel-
ling" found in several earlier decisions show that scrutiny of interests has not al-
ways been semantically consistent. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 430-34
(1984) (describing interest needed to justify racial considerations in custody bat-
tles as "compelling" but later holding "interests of the child" were "substantial"
interests that pass strict scrutiny); see also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196
(1964) (holding that "permissible" ends justify racial classification). Palmore invali-
dated the lower court's custody ruling based primarily on scrutiny of the means,
holding that consideration of race was not necessary to further the goal of protect-
ing the child's interest. See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433 (assuming that protecting chil-
dren in custody cases was compelling interest).
153. See, e.g., REHNQUIST, supra note 91, at vii, 11, 218-25 (defending Abraham
Lincoln's philosophy: "Are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the govern-
ment itself to go to pieces, lest that one be violated?"). Indeed, many of those who
find racial profiling distasteful in less threatening times now support its use be-
cause of the overarching importance of stopping further catastrophes and protect-
ing the country during wartime. See, e.g., Newshour, supra note 43 (interviewing
University of California Law Professor Gail Heriot, who under "normal" circum-
stances disagreed with racial profiling, but now supported it "with the lightest of
possible touches").
154. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (holding simply that it is "'ob-
vious and unarguable' that no governmental interest is more compelling than the
security of the Nation" without requiring any more specificity or factual inquiry
(quoting Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964))); accord Cole v.
Young, 351 U.S. 536, 546 (1956); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d
1205, 1212-13 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (finding vague compelling interest in "national
security" and "foreign policy"), affJd 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Stehney v.
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served just as well before the court hears any facts if the defending party
argues it acted to protect "national security."' 55 Here, using this method,
the compelling interest test is easily met. 156 Indeed, in this case, the Na-
tion's search for protection may never have been more compelling, con-
sidering the worst attack in history, the war in the Middle East and the
almost daily threats of more terrorism from Arab extremists. 15 7
The government's ease in meeting the first prong by claiming "na-
tional security" gives rise to a genuine policy concern. Especially because
the current war effort is so broad and amorphous, the "national security"
umbrella can be too quickly opened to shield an expansive set of restric-
tions from any downpour of constitutional concern. 158 As Justice Jackson
warned in Korematsu, if courts will not reassess what the military or govern-
ment has deemed to be in its national security interest, a broad range of
measures become permissible as long as they are narrowly tailored to any
security interest.15 9 Because equal protection is the principle invalidation
of racial discrimination, strict scrutiny's first prong should not be met by
such "over-expansive" standards. 160 Indeed, the Adarand Court itself im-
Perry, 907 F. Supp. 806, 823 (D.N.J. 1995) (upholding polygraph testing to work
with National Security Agency as valid based on compelling interest in "protecting
national security"); Farrakhan v. Reagan, 669 F. Supp. 506, 510-12 (D.D.C. 1987)(finding general compelling interest in national security but also finding more
specific interest in ending state sponsored terrorism), affd without opinion, 851 F.2d
1500 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
155. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1965) (restricting right to in-
ternational travel by merely citing "the weightiest considerations of national
security").
156. See Humanitarian Law Project, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1212-13 (giving deference
to government's claim of "national security" in upholding constitutionality of anti-
terrorist legislation); Farrakhan, 669 F. Supp. at 512 (similarly finding "legitimate
and compelling interests in national security" in upholding anti-terrorism
measures).
157. See Grunwald, supra note 7 (headlining immediate threat).
158. Cf Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (holding
that general, overbroad interests do not sufficiently justify racial classification and
specifically stating that "[s] ocietal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous
a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy").
159. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244-48 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing majority for constitutionalizing military deference because
its reasoning would expand to cover "new purposes"). Justice Jackson feared "the
tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic," a sentiment born
to fruition when courts simply adopt vague military/governmental claims of na-
tional security. See id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (quoting BENJAMIN N. CAR-
DOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCEss 51 (1921)).
160. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (holding that vague interest of "societal dis-
crimination" insufficient and over-expansive to support racially based remedies be-
cause of strict scrutiny's tough requirements); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432
(1984) (holding that "core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment" is to "do away
with all governmentally imposed discriminations based on race"); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980) (Stevens,J., dissenting) (arguing that "[u]nless
Congress clearly articulates the need and basis for a racial classification" interest
could not be found compelling).
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pliedly favored greater detailed inquiry by noting that even "the most rigid
scrutiny" sometimes fails to detect invidious racial discrimination. 16 1 It is
an uneasy protection against the government when the trumpets of "na-
tional security" can so readily drown out a constitutional right often re-
ferred to as inalienable.
16 2
To assure strictness in strict scrutiny and prevent overbroad measures,
a more precise solution would be either to balance the particular national
security interest against the racially-based measure sought or, more practi-
cally, to require a definition of the governmental interest in light of the
particularized circumstances. 163 Although employed usually in other con-
stitutional arenas, a balancing test is not outside the realm of determining
whether an interest is compelling and, more importantly, serves to narrow
each governmental interest distinctly to eliminate over-broad applica-
tion. 164 As the Court explained in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,165 a
"compelling state interest" should not describe a "minimum quantum of
governmental concern," but rather should be tested for degree in light of
the particular invasion of rights. 166 Without subsuming narrow tailoring
analysis, such a philosophy could be applied to equal protection doctrine
to protect against heavy-handed Korematsu-like methods by allowing a
court to determine that general governmental interests are never "compel-
161. SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (criticiz-
ing Korematsu's failure to detect unconstitutional racism).
162. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (describing racial classi-
fication as "odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doc-
trine of equality") (citation omitted).
163. For a discussion of more precise solutions, see infra notes 162-66 and
accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670-
73 (1989) (determining that compelling national self-protection interest in ensur-
ing that front-line drug officers have integrity and judgment unimpaired by drugs
outweighs Fourth Amendment protection against searches without individualized
suspicion). In cases such as these, analysis of compelling interests in light of the
specific facts facilitates determining, without speculation, whether the measure
adopted serves that interest. See id. at 686 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
because interest is limited to front-line drug officials, violating Fourth Amendment
rights of all officials that carry guns is overbroad).
165. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
166. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 661 (applying, in Fourth Amendment context,
more balanced version of compelling interest). Upholding a school's random
urinalysis for athletes, Justice Scalia's majority opinion warned:
It is a mistake, however, to think that the phrase "compelling state inter-
est," in the Fourth Amendment context, describes a fixed, minimum
quantum of governmental concern, so that one can dispose of a case by
answering in isolation the question: Is there a compelling state interest
here? Rather, the phrase describes an interest that appears important
enough to justify the particular search at hand ....
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ling enough" to justify such broad and extreme constitutional
aberrance.
16 7
An even more protective solution, the Supreme Court in Adarand and
Wygant urged "particularized" investigation to find a specific compelling
interest.1 68 Indeed, adopting a more case-by-case evaluation of the na-
tional security ends, the Korematsu Court itself found (rightly or wrongly) a
sense of supreme urgency in exact circumstances where "properly consti-
tuted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast," but then
failed to inquire into the particularity (narrow tailoring) of means. 169 Per-
haps then, it is a low level of specificity that is truly the risk, with a needed
clarification that compelling interests do not exist in broad form to be
picked from when the government needs to justify equal protection re-
straint. 170 Illustrating the risks inherent in vague national security inter-
ests, in United States v. Rezaq,171 the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia defined a compelling interest specifically as "secrecy
of information important to our national security .... -172 The court then
determined that Rezaq's due process rights did not have to be sacrificed
167. SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (giving
weight to argument that compelling interest prong should be more strictly con-
strued by noting that Korematsu correctly applied strict scrutiny but failed to detect
illegitimate discrimination).
168. See id. at 229 (applying Justice Stevens' argument that compelling inter-
est must be shown by "clearly articulated need and basis"); Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986) (requiring showing of "particularized" past
discrimination from specific governmental institution before remedial interest
could be deemed compelling because danger of overbroad race-based remedies).
The Wygant Court noted, "No one doubts that there has been serious racial dis-
crimination in this country. But as the basis for imposing discriminatory legal rem-
edies that work against innocent people, societal discrimination is insufficient and
over-expansive." Id. at 276.
169. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (finding com-
pelling interest in immediate threat from attack through West, but completely de-
ferring to military/government judgment that such extreme methods were
necessary). It is this lack of searching scrutiny that, in many views, makes Korematsu
a dangerous legal philosophy. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 344 n.30 (1993)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing Korematsu as failing to require case-by-case in-
vestigation as to whether internment was necessary to fulfill national security inter-
est); REHNQUIST, supra note 91, at 205-06 (analyzing argument that Korematsu was
too deferential to government's assertion that measures were necessary).
170. For a discussion of an example of the risks inherent in low specificity in
compelling interests and protection afforded by the more exact definition, see
supra note 169 and accompanying text and infra notes 171-72 and accompanying
text.
171. 899 F. Supp. 697 (D.D.C. 1995).
172. See Rezaq, 899 F. Supp. at 708 (finding compelling interest not merely in
national security, but in "protecting both the secrecy of information important to
our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effec-
tive operation of our foreign intelligence" (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 175
(1985))). In Rezaq, a hijacking case, the government sought a protective order
prohibiting at trial use of classified material the defense had requested. See id. at
707 (summarizing facts).
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because other safeguards met the secret information concerns.1 73 Had
the court allowed broad "national security" to suffice as the compelling
interest, it could not have found the interest alternatively met and Rezaq's
rights would have been unnecessarily compromised.174 Consistent with
strict scrutiny, a higher level of specificity in defining the interest will then
help determine whether anti-terrorist measures are narrowly tailored to
meet the exact interest, thereby fully protecting against unnecessary racial
classification. 17
5
D. Korematsu the Undead: The Haunting of Current Narrowly Tailored
Scrutiny by Old War-Time Deference
By early standards, such as applied in Korematsu, courts determining
"narrowly tailored means" afforded great deference to the government's
decisions and findings on what was necessary to fulfill its security inter-
ests. 176 Partially because of claims of immediacy, Korematsu failed to re-
quire any consideration of less racially intrusive alternatives or evidence
that group exclusion and internment would be necessary to quell immi-
nent threat.1 77 Under recent "narrowly tailored" analysis, however, racial
classification must undergo an exacting scrutiny that the method is the
173. See id. at 711 (analyzing more specific interest concerning secret infor-
mation). Rezaq held that the due process right to fair and expeditious trial pre-
vailed because other safeguards provided adequate confidentiality. See id. (holding
that government could not prosecute defendant and restrict his ability to use infor-
mation in his defense).
174. See generally id., at 697 (illustrating importance of defining national secur-
ity interests in light of specific circumstances and implying risk of generalized "na-
tional security" is compelling interest).
175. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) ("In the
absence of particularized findings, a court could uphold remedies that are ageless
in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future.");
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 783-84 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (re-
sponding to Court's ad hoc application of "plenary power" to exclude aliens based
on general foreign relations and national defense interests). According to Justice
Marshall in Kleindienst, the First Amendment rights of a group that sought en-
trance of a foreign scholar could not be subordinated by a general interest in for-
eign relations. See id. at 782 n.5 (citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965)).
Justice Marshall limited his national security interest to "actual threats." Id. at 783.
176. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944) ("[W]e cannot
reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that
there were disloyal members of that population, whose number and strength could
not be precisely and quickly ascertained."); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 344 n.30
(1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing Korematsu for failing to apply stricter
scrutiny).
177. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218-24 (deferring to what govemmental au-
thorities deemed necessary to further compelling interest). In fact, Korematsu used
post-exclusion investigations that showed "loyalties to Japan" as a kind of justifica-
tion for giving military authorities free reign to decide what methods to use. See id.
at 219 (summarizing findings provided by military).
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necessary and only solution.' 78 Which standard is applied will determine
the fate of racially-based terrorist screening.
The Korematsu standard has two strengths in the current political cli-
mate.1 79 First, it directly considered the rare collision of racial classifica-
tion with immediate, war-time national security interests. 180 The attacks
on Pearl Harbor and the World Trade Center share stunning parallels. 1 81
The comparable immediate and identifiable threat could urge similar def-
erence to government decisions made to deal with that threat.182 The
spotlight on the Japanese now shifts to Arabs as the source of the identifi-
able threat.' 83 Further, similar to the perceived urgency of the Japanese
threat, the present terrorist threat seems even more urgent.1 84 Second,
the nature of many national security measures requires deference to gov-
ernment choices.' 85 Because knowledge of what tips off officials would
allow terrorists to avoid certain behavior, terrorist screening shares this
undercurrent of deference that precludes the government from explain-
ing its methods and leaves courts with no alternative but agreement.' 86
178. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506-08 (1989)
(requiring Richmond to show that it had considered race-neutral means to in-
crease minority business participation and use of numbers that were not based on
assumptions about minorities); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171-85
(1987) (examining several factors: efficacy of alternatives, flexibility and duration,
relationship of numerical goals to relevant labor market and impact of relief on
rights of third parties).
179. See Saito, supra note 33, at 10, 11 (warning of Korematsu's validity).
180. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 (expressing at outset that case would be
determined under racial classification standards).
181. See William Rees-Mogg, Attacks Are Worst on US Since Pearl Harbor, TIMES
(London), Sept. 12, 2001, at 19 (comparing similarities between attacks).
182. See REHNQUIST, supra note 91, 208-11 (contending that although discrimi-
natory action against second-generation Japanese-Americans was overbroad, spe-
cific threat perceived, based on intercepted messages, could justify keeping them
from work in aircraft factories). Rehnquist stated that the threat also allowed dis-
proportionate treatment of first-generation (Issei) Japanese immigrants, describ-
ing them as "enemy aliens in time of war." See id. (discussing governmental powers
during war-time).
183. See Saito, supra note 33, at 10-11, 24-26 (enumerating folly that, in time of
war or emergency, military can decide ad hoc which racial group is "infected" with
threatening ideologies).
184. Compare REHNQUIST, supra note 91, at 184, 206-11 (detailing intelligence
and facts behind threat from Japanese loyalists), with Kellman, supra note 124, at
419 (explaining seriousness of biological attack), and CNN, supra note 124 (updat-
ing current Anthrax attack suspected to come from Islamic terrorists).
185. See, e.g., CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 175 (1985) (explaining sensitive na-
ture of classified information relating to national security); United States v. Rezaq,
899 F. Supp. 697, 708 (D.D.C. 1995) (similarly giving credit to national security
interest in protecting classified information because very nature of that informa-
tion could compromise foreign intelligence operations).
186. See Higgins, supra note 121, at 50 (explaining that details of FAA comput-
erized profiling system are kept secret because if they were known, terrorists could
evade profiles); Nojeim, supra note 44, at 6-8 (same).
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The current national security emergency breathes new life into these
arguments.18 7
Conversely, modern narrow tailoring analysis utterly refutes that def-
erential standard. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 8 8 the Supreme
Court invalidated a race-based construction contract plan and expressly
refused to allow the government to pronounce necessity as it had in Kore-
matsu.'8 9 The Court in Adarand commended Korematsu's application of
"the most searching scrutiny" but chided Korematsu's reasoning as failing
to detect illegitimate discrimination. 190 Thus, to eliminate this risk,
Adarand combined previous jurisprudence to require an ultimate "de-
tailed examination, both as to ends and as to means." 191 Many prongs
attach to this detailed investigation. 19 2 Two, however, immediately stand
out to invalidate racially based terrorist screening.
First, racial profiling has not been conclusively shown to "substantially
address, if not achieve" the goal of preventing terrorist attacks. 193 Profil-
ing adopted earlier in U.S. history failed to stop over two dozen hijackings
in one year.19 4 Profiling is easy to thwart and regularly fails to catch both
terrorists and drug traffickers.' 95 Further, a terrorist's race is not pre-
cise.' 96 A vast majority of Arabs have nothing to do with terrorism and as
many non-Arab Americans have committed terrorist attacks as have
Arabs.19 7 Although September 11, 2001 is strong in our minds, we must
187. See REHNQUIST, supra note 91, at 184-211 (leaving open possibility that
racially-based remedies could be adopted in war-time if imposed very narrowly or
against non-citizen aliens).
188. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
189. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 501 (rejecting Korematsu approach by holding that
"blind judicial deference to legislative or executive pronouncements of necessity
has no place in equal protection analysis") (emphasis added).
190. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (sup-
porting its position that only highest scrutiny is appropriate).
191. Id.
192. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (listing several
factors courts must consider in determining narrow tailored means).
193. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 915 (1996) (finding that voting redistrict-
ing plan was not narrowly tailored because it did not actually ensure achievement
of government's compelling interest).
194. See Nojeim, supra note 44, at 5-6 (reporting that in 1972, the last year
United States used profiling, there were twenty-eight hijackings of United States
airplanes). Notably, the hijackings decreased significantly when the FAA adopted
a policy of x-raying everyone and abandoned profiling. See id. (reporting policy of
searching everyone).
195. See id. (noting that it is easy for terrorist who knows profile to use some-
one else or change behavior); Rhee, supra note 13, at 869-70 (documenting thwart-
ing of profiling system employed to target Finnish people before Pan Am Flight
103 bombing and "deplorable" record of drug war profiling that has obviously not
stopped serious drug problem).
196. See generally Saito, supra note 33 (explaining folly in "racing" Arabs as
terrorists).
197. See Nojeim, supra note 44, at 6 (reporting incongruence of identities of
terrorists pre-World Trade Center attacks).
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not forget that the Unibomber mailings, the Oklahoma City bombing,19 8
attempts to blow up CIA recruiting offices during the Vietnam War,19 9 a
1996 attempt by a Florida student to board an airplane with grenades, 20 0
and numerous other terrorist acts were committed by non-Arab Ameri-
cans.20 1 Stereotyping is hardly narrowly tailored, and "generalized asser-
tions" or "assumptions" that minorities will behave in a certain way do not
meet the modern means requirements. 20 2
Second, a number of "racially neutral alternatives" exist that could
prove at least as effective as racial profiling. 20 3 Airport security is currently
under private control that is blamed for numerous security shortcom-
ings.20 4 Federal replacement or oversight of airline security is expected to
provide much relief.20 5 Armed officers on flights, or "sky marshals," could
achieve a similar effect. 20 6 Intensifying random searches is also a viable
alternative. 20 7 Professor David Cole proposed perhaps the most Ghandian
alternative to racial profiling: try to develop good relations with the Is-
lamic community to help identify the true threats.20 8 Unlike correcting
specifically race-based past discrimination, national security or even pre-
vention of Middle Eastern terrorism does not compel a race-based solu-
tion.209 Essentially, with a vague interest such as "preventing terrorism"
there are literally hundreds of alternatives that must be considered before
racial methods can be installed.2 10
198. See Saito, supra note 33, at 11-13 (discussing Oklahoma City bombing,
which was committed by two white Americans, and its perception as work of Arab
terrorists).
199. See Sievert, supra note 13, at 1436 (recounting American protesters' at-
tempts at terror).
200. See Nojeim, supra note 44, at 5-7 (recounting Florida incident).
201. See id. at 6 ("Profiling does not fill security gaps, it creates them.").
202. See City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500-01, 506 (1989)
(finding thirty percent minority contract plan not narrowly tailored because it was
based on "generalized assertion" that racial classification was relevant to goal and
"completely unrealistic" assumptions that minorities would choose particular trade
in proportion to population); Nightline: Profile, supra note 16 (broadcasting Profes-
sor David Cole's reiteration of idea that racial stereotypes are irrelevant).
203. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 507-08 (analyzing whether race-neutral alternatives
were considered before adopting race-based policy) (citing United States v. Para-
dise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987)).
204. See Weale, supra note 14 (reporting that United States Congress had re-
ceived update on airline security revealing "serious vulnerabilities").
205. See Sharon Begley et al., The Fallout-Will We Ever Be Safe Again?, NEws-
WEEK, Sept. 24, 2001, at 58 (reporting several new security measures).
206. See id. (stating that FAA will likely put more officers on board flights).
207. See Rhee, supra note 13, at 874 (advocating intensified random searching
already in existence).
208. See Nightline: Profile, supra note 16 (broadcasting interview session on ra-
cial profiling of Arabs after September 11 th).
209. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (reiter-
ating that race-based action must be "necessary").
210. See Higgins, supra note 121, at 52 (reporting other alternatives to profil-
ing in general include more sophisticated scanners, better baggage/passenger
[Vol. 47: p. 451
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Therein lies the choice, and a court faced with it makes a critical de-
termination of racial policy. Past standards are deferential to government
decisions but are now highly criticized. 211 Current legal standards for nar-
row tailoring invalidate screening terrorists based on race, but were
promulgated by the Court to examine affirmative action and remedial ra-
cial measures. 2 12 With the defense of the nation to balance, the tempta-
tion surely exists to distinguish current law from war-time
jurisprudence.2 1 3 Indeed, applying the current equal protection analysis
risks handcuffing law enforcement when the need for protection is the
greatest.2 14 Such reasoning does rationalize race-based screening outside
the United States. 215 Nazi Germany reportedly racially profiled those of
Jewish descent boarding its Zeppelins in the 1930s.2 1 6 The existence of
constitutionally guaranteed rights, however, stands as the distinction that
prevents a government to do whatever it deems necessary to protect it-
self.2 17 Despite the need for secretive procedures, asJustice Brennan rec-
ognized in United States v. Stanley,218 allowing government officials
absolute freedom to determine necessary methods simply by invoking na-
tional security has resulted in unconstitutional practices, such as involun-
tary drug and chemical experiments on United States soldiers.219 The
matching and creation of FAA security oversight committee to prevent
breakdowns).
211. See, e.g., Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, §1, §2(a), 102
Stat. 903-904 (1988) (condemning internment and reasons behind it and provid-
ing reparations to Japanese internment survivors); City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500-01, 506 (1989) (rejecting idea that government can deter-
mine for itself what is necessary to its compelling interest when it employs suspect
classifications). For a further discussion, see supra notes 165-74 and accompanying
text.
212. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 201-08 (explaining minority contracting
plan that was its focus); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (exam-
ining court ordered race-based remedy of past discrimination). For a further dis-
cussion, see supra notes 165-73 for further discussion.
213. See Yen, supra note 95, at 2 (examining possible "rehabilitation" of Kore-
matsu's reasoning).
214. See Lacayo, supra note 33, at 92 (weighing protection of privacy versus
obvious current need for safety).
215. See, e.g., Weale, supra note 14 (reporting use of racial profiling in Israel
has been willing trade off of security for civil rights); Dan, supra note 56 (describ-
ing Israel's and El Al's security measures).
216. See Rhee, supra note 13, at 849-51 (outlining German S.S. officer's use of
racial profiling).
217. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 523 (1985) (noting "danger
that high federal officials will disregard constitutional rights in their zeal to protect
the national security" and finding that danger sufficient to deny such officials abso-
lute immunity from constitutional violations); PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT, 365 (1999) (explaining that many allies of United States
lacked "inalienable rights" that Americans are guaranteed constitutionally).
218. 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
219. See Stanley, 483 U.S. at 690-91 (Brennan,J., concurring and dissenting in
part) (criticizing majority's deference to military and governmental decisions and
noting that prior cases show damage done when government is given free hand to
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United States should be wary of adopting measures merely because the
military or government has labeled them necessary to war-time or national
security interests. 220
Even if it were certain that these measures would end terrorist attacks,
that end cannot be the only consideration. If it were, then even more
draconian methods, such as the Japanese internment, would be fullyjusti-
fied. 22 1 Racial equality has played too profound a role in United States
history since World War II to allow the government to now sanction ine-
quality under any interest.222 If America can endure assassinations, lynch-
ings and bombings, stomach bloody riots and order federal troops into
school houses and governors into custody to end racial disparity, it can
address terrorism without compromising that ideal. 223 Most importantly,
our judicial system has assimilated this regard for racial distinction as odi-
ous and irrelevant. 224 As the country weathered the bloodshed necessary
to set a course toward racial equality, courts diverged irrevocably from ra-
cial precedent existing at the time of Korematsu.225 In the name of ulti-
mate equality, the Supreme Court has promulgated a standard that is
rooted in the idea that it does not matter what type of racial method exists
violate constitutional rights of soldiers without fear of reprisal) (citing Jaffee v.
United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981); Schnurman v. United States, 490 F.
Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1980); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F.Supp. 344 (D.D.C.
1979)).
220. Contra Begley, supra note 205 (noting several extreme security measures
that United States is considering adopting).
221. See REHNQUIST, supra note 91, at 184-202 (providing details of intern-
ment that show that if any Japanese-American was going to threaten national secur-
ity, extreme measures certainly stopped him); Saito, supra note 33 (discussing
Japanese internment and subsequent reparations).
222. See, e.g., IRONS, supra note 217, at 383-408 (detailing passions and politi-
cal fervor that surrounded civil rights movement, especially concerning educa-
tional integration, that led to Supreme Court's landmark decision in Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); Remembering Kent State, COLUMBUS Dis-
PATCH, Apr. 30, 2000, at IA (recalling racial tension and civil rights movement's
effect on anti-Vietnam War protests and conglomerate protest on campus of Kent
State University that left four dead in Ohio).
223. See IRONS, supra note 217, at 404-09 (detailing some bloodshed and mea-
sures taken after Brown decision).
224. SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (finding
that racial classifications are "harmful to the entire body politic" (quoting Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533-35, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting))); Brown,
347 U.S. at 495 (finding that educational racial segregation itself causes detrimen-
tal effects); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 557 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Constitution is "color-blind" and cannot tolerate racism of separate
but equal accommodations).
225. See IRONS, supra note 217, at 398-400 (detailing breaking of Supreme
Court from racial biases of Plessy v. Ferguson and quoting Justice Marshall's exulta-
tion "They've got to yield to the Constitution!" as turning point in racial
jurisprudence).
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or why it exists, merely whether it exists. 226 Adarand equates all racial clas-
sification as presumptively invidious and irrelevant, expressly eliminating
the argument that a certain interest or claim can provide reason not to
subject the classification to the most restrictive requirements. Thus, the
current movement to tightly scrutinize benign racial plans cannot be un-
done back to deference for malignant ones, even in times of great national
threat.2
27
IV. CONCLUSION
The realities of this theoretical analysis should not assure Arabs or
civil rights activists that all will be fine. This Comment warns first of the
willingness of America to engage in racial profiling in the name of anti-
terrorism.228 It then warns that the Fourth Amendment fails to protect
against racially based anti-terrorism methods.2 29 It further suggests that
"national security" deference could still be abused to trod over racial
equality by renewing old passes given to government/military decisions.2 30
Finally, this Comment finds that equal protection jurisprudence will invali-
date the racial methods through its narrow tailoring requirement, even
during time of war.23 1
In totality, however, it is only after both political and constitutional
safeguards fail that detention and searches against Arabs are doctrinally
eliminated. 23 2 This should be enough to evidence that racial discrimina-
tion is alive in the United States and that crises such as war give such think-
ing a chance to remain unchecked.23 3 Further, the difference between
the two analyses, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment, is not so dissimilar
that one may not bleed into the other.23 4 As surprised as the legal world
226. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235-37 (expressly stating that there is never any
difference between benign and malicious racial discrimination and that strict scru-
tiny ensures "consistent" and "detailed" analysis of ends and means).
227. See REHNQUIST, supra note 91, at 209 (admitting that justifying intern-
ment of Japanese American citizens "should have taken far more substantial find-
ings . . . even in wartim') (emphasis added).
228. For a discussion of the theories and movement toward profiling those of
Arab descent, see supra notes 119-34 and accompanying text.
229. For a discussion of the Fourth Amendment, see supra notes 177-228 and
accompanying text.
230. For a discussion of the application of national security deference to
equal protection standards, see supra notes 147-227 and accompanying text.
231. For a discussion of the validity of current equal protection doctrine, see
supra notes 167-227 and accompanying text.
232. Cf Beck & Daly, supra note 25, at 612-18 (examining difficulties in practi-
cal protection under Equal Protection Clause); Knight & Kurnik, supra note 25, 18-
21 (same).
233. See Yen, supra note 95, at 7 (urging that scholars study Korematsu and its
legacy closely lest "climate become ripe for rewriting history that so rightly con-
demns the internment" and again allows curtailment of civil liberty during
wartime).
234. Compare United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-60 (1976)
(stating that Fourth Amendment does not prohibit limited vehicle stops without
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was to learn that the Fourth Amendment protected officers who intention-
ally used race, it could be in for a similar shock if making a reasonable
detention became a defense for an equal protection violation. 2 35 Could
making a lawful stop be a narrowly tailored means of furthering an inter-
est in national security?236 This theory does seem incongruent, but it
points out the insufficiency of protection in a constitutional interpretation
that both allows racial discrimination and outlaws it.
Liam Braber
reasonable suspicion if sufficiently high number of people with apparent ancestry
are involved in crime), with Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (al-
lowing, under equal protection, Japanese exclusion based on perceived threat
from high number of Japanese race).
235. See Beck & Daly, supra note 25, at 597 (noting that "[s]cholars, journal-
ists, and lawyers promptly and vociferously assailed . . . Whren").
236. For a discussion in full of narrowly tailored means standards, see supra
notes 176-227 and accompanying text.
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